The Reform of State Peasants in Right-Bank
Ukraine
in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century
- Monetization of Feudal Obligations and Agrarian Capitalism -
Takeshi MATSUMURA
Copyright
(c) 1998 by
the Slavic Research Center( English
/ Japanese ) All rights reserved.
-Summary-
Under Russian Rule, agrarian capitalism in Right-Bank Ukraine, one
of the former territories of the Kingdom of Poland, developed through
the "Prussian path." It is well-known that after the Emancipation of
1861 the local landed nobility (mostly Polish) were increasingly
involved in capitalist plantations, while ex-serfs holding
insignificant pieces of land were employed by these plantations as
agricultural laborers. Even prior to the Emancipation, the famous
inventory reform, which aimed at improving the serfs" living
conditions, actually increased feudal obligations imposed on the upper
strata of serfs, and thus accelerated the transfer of their land to the
serf masters. Moreover, ceilings on corvee labor, one of the mottos of
this reform, stimulated the conversion of serfs into agricultural
laborers.
This paper focuses on another group of peasants in Right-Bank
Ukraine - state peasants. In contrast to their counterparts in the
Great Russian and Siberian provinces, state peasants in this region
lacked "prosperous" categories, such as "Siberian plowmen,"
"chernososhnye peasants," "Tatars," and "iasachnye." State peasants in
the Right Bank consisted of peasants of the former Orthodox monasterial
estates, "commanders" peasants (krest"iane starostva)," and peasants of
the former Catholic church or Polish estates confiscated by the
government. Except for the first category, corvee labor was imposed on
the state peasants, while state peasants in the Great Russian provinces
paid their feudal obligations in cash. In other words, the situation of
the state peasants in the Right Bank was more similar to that of the
serfs of the same region than to state peasants in the Great Russian
provinces.
State plantations in the Right Bank (even the ones established by
the government on the basis of confiscated Catholic or Polish nobles"
estates) continued to be controlled by Polish leaseholders, who did
everything to preserve the imposition of corvee labor on state
peasants. And the tsarist government, even after the 1830-31 rising,
was interested in keeping the lease system of state properties in
operation to appease the local Polish elite. Taking advantage of the
rapid expansion of grain export in the first half of the nineteenth
century, not only serf masters but also these leaseholders expanded the
share of plantations directly managed by themselves at the expense of
peasants" allotments.
The Kiselev reform of state peasants was implemented in Right-Bank
Ukraine according to the law approved by the tsar on December 28, 1839.
At this stage, as would be the case with the future inventory reform,
this reform was only aimed at making the majority of state peasants
medium-scale landholders, monitoring the imposition of feudal
obligations. In 1844, however, due to the efforts of the
Governor-General of the South-Western Region of the Empire, Dmitrii
Bibikov, the reform gained a radical momentum. The obligations were
monetized, Polish leaseholders were fired, and the state plantations,
which had in effect been the remnants of the former Polish and Catholic
manors, were divided among the state peasants. Various assets attached
to these plantations (storage facilities, offices, mills, taverns, and
distilleries) were liquidated.
What were the results of this reform which were aimed, at least
subjectively, at improving the state peasants" well-being? This writer
compared the economic situation between the former state peasants and
the former serfs in the Right Bank during the 1860-1880s. As mentioned
above, Right-Bank serfs" living conditions before the Kiselev reform
were similar to those of the state peasants of this region. Therefore,
this comparison enables us to see the effects of the two reforms -the
Kiselev and inventory ones. According to statistics from the 1860s, it
is true that the former state peasants owned, on average, slightly
larger allotments than the former serfs. But it was impossible for the
both groups to sustain their living only by their allotments. It was
necessary to find additional earnings, and precisely in this regard the
situation of the former state peasants was much worse than that of the
former serfs in the region.
Because of the existence of large-scale estates in their
neighborhood, in particular the sugar beet plantations, serfs (the
former serfs, afterwards) could be converted into skilled, experienced
agricultural laborers, whereas after the liquidation of state
plantations (the former) state peasants could not find any similar
chances for employment. There remained few plantations in their
neighborhood. This is why statistics of the then passport
administration indicate that most of the migrant, unskilled
agricultural laborers with which the Right Bank provided Southern
(Steppe) Ukraine were released from the former state peasant counties
(volosti). Paradoxically, the reform of state peasants in the Right
Bank helped the "Prussian path" of agrarian capitalism not in the Right
Bank itself but in Steppe Ukraine. This writer cannot agree with the
dominant opinion in historiography presented initially by N.M.
Druzhinin, a Soviet historian, that the reform of state peasants in the
Right Bank improved their well-being, albeit its egalitarian tendency
hindered the capitalist development of agriculture. The "Prussian path"
was the only viable way for Right-Bank agriculture to develop. Bridling
this, the reform of state peasants blockaded the way to improve their
well-being too.