ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS(6)

SRC Winter Symposium Socio-Cultural Dimensions of the Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World ( English / Japanese )

ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS (6)

Sergei Arutiunov
(Institute of Ethnography, RAS)

6. The Western Caucasus - Kabardin-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, Adygeia.

The Republic of Kabardin-Balkaria has an approximate population of one million. Of this million, about 50 % are Kabardins, 30% Russians, less than 10% Balkars, and there are also many others - Koreans, Jews, Georgians, Turks etc.. Small in numbers as they are, they nevertheless are inclined to occupy distinct niches, e.g., Jews in commerce and some crafts, Georgians in restaurant service, Koreans in vegetable gardening.

Kabardins are the same detribalized Adyghe as Cherkessians, from which they practically indistinguishable. However, being the largest group among Adyghes, they think more about the consolidation of their power and cultural vitality within the Republic, than about the reconsruction of Greater Adygheia. On the whole, their relations with Russians are friendly, in spite of memories of Russian atrocities during the Caucasian War of 1817-1864. There are some mixed marriages, though not too many, and the influence of Islam on everyday life is not very great. Together with Adygheians and Chechenians, Kabardins have been most active in the Caucasian Nations' Confederation (KNK) and in volunteering to fight on the Abkhazian side against Georgians in the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict.

There is no pronounced enmity between Kabardins and Russians, and on the surface, the mutual relations may look quite friendly. However, there is competition between the two, since they share the same occupational niche. Sharing the same occupation does not lead to competition in agriculture, the more so because Kabardin villages and Russian villages are in most cases separated territorially. But in the cities, highly educated and sophisticated Kabardins, many doctors, lawyers, engineers, artists etc., particularly in conditions of growing unemployment of salary-men, find themselves a competing with Russians. Many Russians complain that the better jobs are offered to Kabardins, in spite of their alleged lower professional skill. I cannot say whether these allegations are justified but they certainly predetermine a very slow and gradual but still continuing diminishing of the share of Russians, Jews and other non-natives, in the urban population of Kabardin-Balkaria, and, even more importantly, in the jobs requiring high skills or providing certain advantages in payment, in social prestige etc.. The same tendencies can be observed in the declining recreational (tourist) business.

For an outside observer the relations between Russians on one side and Kabardinians and Balkars on the other side, may look like problems on the individual, personal or local level, but they are not openly pronounced either socially or politically. If there are more profound problems, they are latent and avoided. This cannot be said, however, about the relations between Kabardinians and Balkars.

Balkars, many of whom were exiled and spent 1944-1957 in Central Asia, returned and were provided with additional territories for settlement, (apart from the mountain gorges that were been their traditional home), in the relatively lowland territories which belonged to the richest Kabardin princely families before the October Revolution. These territories were, naturally, nationalized after the Revolution, but, since they were initially used mostly as pastures for large herds of horses on the property of the former princes and had not been intensively ploughed and cultivated by Kabardins prior to the war, they could be fairly easily allocated to the Balkars,when they returned from the exile, although in some cases the resulting settlements were ethnically mixed, being populated mostly by Balkars, but to a certain extent by Kabardins as well.

At first glance the relationship between Balkars and Kabardins is rather friendly. There are many mixed marriages, in the cities people of two nationalities generally find no problems in coordinating their efforts at their working place, there are some villages with a mixed Kabardinian-Balkar population. However, Balkars often complain about the political and social domination of Kabardins, about lack of Balkar representation in key administrative positions, and about certain handicaps in social career etc..

Kabardins, on the other hand, have some stereotypes about Balkars whom they see as narrow-minded, not smart enough, and generally inferior. Of course, one can hardly deny that many years spent in exile might be responsible for a certain educational retardation among Balkars, and the difference is still noticeable. On the other hand, Balkars, who have access to the alpine pastures, too remote to be exploited by Kabardins, practice very profitable sheep and goat herding and wool processing. They sell the processed wool or even more often ready-knit sweaters, hats, jackets and so on at a good profit. This makes their average income some 10-20 % higher than that of Kabardins. The same applies to Karachais. One of the accusations made about Balkars by Kabardins (who have always been very proud about their social position and general respect of women), is that Balkars overwork their women, and force them to process the wool and knit sweaters all the time.

There is a Balkar nationalist movement, odious for its provocational and violent actions, which insists on the creation of a separate Balkarian republic. Many people in Kabardin-Balkaria, including many Balkars, believe that the aims of the leaders of this movement (an ex-general of the Russian Army, S. Beppaev among them) are rather selfish and that these leaders just want important and prestigeous positions for themselves.

Nevertheless they did manage, in the first half of 1990's, to organize a number of actions, and this provoked some anxiety among Kabardins. In response, the latter insisted, that if Balkaria were to secede, it could claim only genuine original Balkar territories, restricted to narrow and infertile mountain valleys, and not the former domains of the exiled and exterminated Kabardin princes, on whose territory the majority of Balkars live. A number of Kabardinian distinguished historians began a feverish search for archival materials and other proof, that would justify an expulsion of Balkars from the lands they currently occupied. At one point it seemed that the society was on the verge of a break-out of mass violence. However, the government of the Republic acted very wisely; they organized a referendum in which only Balkars were invited to participate, and by the end of 1994 it revealed that less than 5% of the total Balkar population really supported Beppaev' ideas. Recently, in the fall of 1996, there was a new attempt to create an 'ad hoc' shadow government of the 'Balkar Republic,' and again the outcome of a renewed attempt by extreme nationalists to aggravate the situation confirmed that not the total number of active supporters of extremists would hardly exceed one thousand but that even their passive sympathizers are very few in number.

The general pattern of factors that determine the relations between Kabardins and Balkars is basically the same as the pattern of relations between Ossetian and Ingushes in North Ossetia before the expulsion of the Ingushes. It is true that Ingushes, after the beginning of perestroika, started to demand re-unification with Ingushes of Ingushetia, while Balkars for only a short time in 1950's and 1960's, rised the question of unification with Karachais, and later abandoned this idea. But there are many similarities. Both Balkars and Ingushes returned after a 13 long years of exile. Both lag culturally behind their more numerous neighbors in social and educational development and both are considered by their neighbors as somewhat inferior. In both cases there is a dispute about the ownership of property on lands they now occupy. Why, then, have the relations between Balkars and Kabardins have remained mainly loyal and peaceful, in spite of active and violent extremist propaganda, while among Ingushes of North Ossetia this kind of propaganda has had complete success and led to armed conflicts and the subsequent eviction of the Ingushes? Why do Kabardins not mind living with Balkars in a polyethnic society, while it seems that a majority of Ossetians feel a strong intolerance and often a burning hatred towards the Ingushes? There may be many reasons for these differences, some of them coming from the past. One of the answers, in my opinion, may be that even when groups live as Kabardins and Balkars do, there is still some danger at a blood-shedding conflict. A careful and balanced administration of the crisis, unequivocal recognition by the authorities of the equal rights of a minority, the provision of some decent perspectives for minority economic and social advancement,a policy which allows the minority to express their preferences democratically, may be able to prevent a conflict. This was the case in Kabardin-Balkaria. But when the administration, supported by public opinion, does not recognize any other way of solving the problem besides brutal suppression and does not try to demonstrate any good will, the minority does not have hope for an amelioration of its situation by peaceful means and may revert to a spontaneous violence. Under these conditions any extremist propaganda may have considerable impact. Even when it is only temporary, it may trigger mass violence and bloodshed and bring the tensions of ethnic confrontation to a point of no return, i.e. to sow the seeds of mutual mistrust and hatred which will pass to younger generations and may become extremely difficult to eradicate.

The Republic of Adygeia occupies a rather unusual position among other republics of the North Caucasus. It is the westernmost of all republics and forms an enclave, which is sides surrounded on all sides by the lands of Krasnodar territory. Previously it was not a republic but an autonomous province within the Krasnodar territory, just as the Karachai-Cherkessian Republic belonged as an autonomous province to the Stavropol territory. Adyggeians, Cherkessians and Kabardins are all branches of the larger ethnic group, which calls itself, in its own language, 'Adyghe'; the difference between 'Adygeian' and 'Adyghe' is of the same order, as, for example, between Slavic and Slovenic, or between Turkic and Turkish. There are no real open ethnic conflict in Adygeia, and one can say that the Russians, who constitute more than the half of the total population, are generally on quite friendly relations with Adygeians.

Even if sometimes one can hear remarks about a certain overrepresentation of Adygeians in key administrative positions, this does not provoke serious discontent among ethnic Russians.

The overwhelming majority of Adygeians do not express any anti-Russian attitudes either. Their high degree of urbanization and Westernization allows them to get along well with Russians, and all of them are quite fluent in the local Russian vernacular. Some Russians may also mention that Adygeians are often dominant in some areas of retail commerce, but not so much in the republic, as in parts of the Krasnodar Territory which encircles the Republic.

Adygeians, who are today a numerical minority in their native land, constitute the largest numbers of mahadjirs (religious refugees) who emigrated to Turkey after the end of the Caucasian War in 1860's. More than two thirds of them emigrated at that time.

The kinship ties between local people and their relatives living in Turkey are vibrant, and now many Turkish, as well as Jordanian Syrian and other foreign ethnic Adygeians, come to visit their relatives; sometimes they acquire some property or participate in joint ventures, but very few decide to repatriate. However, these contacts with the mahadjirs' descendants result in a certain growth of influence of Islam.

There were some hopes and slogans among a certain portion of the nationalistically-minded Adygeians for a restoration of 'Greater Adygeia' which would include both Cherkessia and Kabardinia.

All these three parts of the larger 'Adyghe' ethnic entity maintain close ties and have a feeling of common identity. However, the dialectal difference is considerable, and the Adygeian writing standard slightly differs from the Kabardinian-Cherkessian one. Of all Adyghes the Adygeians certainly have the strongest feeling of all-Adyghe common destiny, but they are also the only ones who have preserved some tribal divisions.

Generally tribal affiliation matters very little and sometimes even is not clearly remembered, but there are two tribes who occupy a rather special position.

One are Shapsugs, mostly living outside the Republic, in a number of rural settlement in the urban district of Sochi. Their main demand is to restore the Shapsug National District which was abolished in late 1920's. However, even if the authorities of Sochi should want to satisfy these demands, it is impossible to carve out a district where Shapsugs would constitute more than 10 % of the population.

They also demand the renaming of a few towns, named after Russian soldiers and sailors, considered heroes by Russians but conquerors by Adyghes, alongside with some other cultural demands.

The other tribe with a special reputation are Bzhedugs, living mostly in the area not very far from the city of Krasnodar.

They are considered the most urbanized and westernized of all Adyghes, but at the same time as poor observants of national standards and values, rather spoiled by civilization. To the envy of other tribes, in Soviet and post-Soviet times, practically all key administrative positions were occupied almost exclusively by Bzhedugs.

A certain 'Armenophobia' is widespread among some Adygeians, as well as among many Cossacks and other Russians of Krasnodar. Historically relations between Armenians on one hand, and Adyghes and Russians on the other hand, despite some enmity, were quite friendly for at least 500 years. The anti-Armenian feelings developed recently due to a huge flow of ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaidjan, Abkhazia, Chechenia and other territories. We may hope that these rather recent prejudices and confrontations might disappear if the social and economic situation changes, and when the state of law and a normal market economy is finally secured.

But so far modern Russia is a land of robber capitalism, of criminal black market economy, and of government-level racketeering led by totally corrupt bureaucrats. Since the law is not a law, a violation of law and violence becomes the law, and a natural search for some mechanism of self-defence leads people of common ethnicity to align along ethnic lines. In a situation in which, a criminal offender is shot or a driver is stopped by a policeman, if the two belong to different nationalities, this enough to ignite an inter-ethnic conflict or at least to produce deep ethnically prejudiced feelings. And if this situation persists for a long time, and there is reason to believe that it will continue to persist, then the mutual prejudices will be deeply internalized and fossilized, and many decades of better times will not amiliorate the situation. I could literally feel this fossilization of mutual hatred in Armenia a few months before the mass exodus of the Azeri population from villages; these villagers had, prior to that, for several decades, lived in perfect friendship with their Armenian neighbors.

The level of confrontation is generally higher in the East of the Caucasus than in the West, Abkhazia being a notable exception.

While there is comparatively little ethnic tension in Adygeia, there is much more in Karachai-Cherkessia. Among some roughly 500 thousand people approximately 40% are Russians (mostly Cossacks), nearly 35% are Turkic-speaking Karachais, less than 10 % are Cherkessians, and there are also a small percent who are Abkhazo-Adyghic speaking Abazins and turkic-speaking Nogais, some are Ossetians who recently have somehow decided to emigrate to Ossetia, and others.

Nogais are linguistically very close but culturally quite different from Karachais, who are highlander agriculturists and cattle-breeders, while Nogais were steppe nomads not so long ago.

The basically dual republic was established after the return of the Karachais from their 13-year long Central Asian exile (1944-1957), and initially culturally more developed and politically more trusted Cherkessians held most key positions. Until the late 1980's the nationalist Karachai movement, the Djamaghat, propagated a policy to secede from the dual republic and to form a republic of their own, with a predominantly Karachai population.

However, recently 'Djamaghat' has lost much of its support. More and more Karachais have begun to believe that in a unified republic. Due to differences in birth-rates, they soon will constitute more than 50% of the population and will be able to form a decision-making majority. Cherkessians and Russians, naturally, do not look forward to such a future. Russian Cossacks have already made some attempts to carve out of Karachai a couple of dwarf separate Cossack 'republics' (Belorechen and Urup-Zelenchuk).

Only a few years ago, in 1992, (i.e. before the frightening examples of attempts to change an ethno-social status-quo by force in Abkhazia and North Ossetia), or in 1991, when Soviet power was paralysed, and Russian Federal power had not yet emerged, there was a possibility of attempts to re-structure the Karachai-Cherkessian Republic, to divide it into Karachai and Cherkessian parts, to carve out Cossack regions, to create some territorial formations for Abazin and Nogais and so on. These questions were discussed at certain levels, within the framework of Yeltsin's administration, with representatives of various ethnic factions and organizations, but the de-facto president of the Republic, Khubiev, (his official position is rather that of speaker), boycotted all these talks and now it is clear that he had good reasons to do so. Should any attempts to implement these projects be made, bloodshed might really begin between Karacais and Cossacks, and maybe among other ethnic sections. Luckily, nothing of the sort has happened, although some attempts, sometimes successful, to squeeze a part of an 'undesirable minority' from the area of predominance of a local 'majority' (depending on the locality, the object of squeezing out might be Russians, Karachais, Ossetes etc.) have taked and are still taking place. However, the overall tendency now consists of a gradual strengthening of the prevailing Karachai power in the republic, while in the areas with a predominant non-Karachai population, local power is in the hands of the local dominant group.

Prior to the Socialist Revolution and Collectivization, there were three estates or classes in the Karachai society: Bii, or feudal lords, Uzden, or free knights-peasants, and Kul, or serfs, who were descended from Biis and partly Uzdens. Over the course of the Revolution, practically all Biis were exterminated or forced into emigration, and power was usurped by Kuls. Even today, most power is concentrated in the hands of the descendants of the Kuls, to the considerable consternation of the Uzdens, who number twice as many. Similar distinctions cannot be ignored in other parts of the Northern Caucasus, but they have there their own specific characteristics.

These distinctions, though hidden, were very important in Soviet society, where they could greatly influence somebody's career on the ladder of the party nomenclatura hierarchy. However, today, when a party position is irrelevant compared to property and monetary capital, they are less and less important.

We may summarize our discussion with a statement that ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus region are more numerous and acute than in any other region of the former Soviet Union, and may be among the most intense in the world. But in most cases these conflicts are not due to any long standing negative stereotypes of other nationalities or a fatal cultural incompatibility, religious fanaticism or racial prejudice: More often than not, they can be defined as quasi-ethnic conflicts or rather as ethnically disguised economic conflicts, caused largely by a lack of legal mechanism of redistribution of property, and directed by a struggle of local elites for key positions. In the Soviet past, they were contained within the framework of competition for positions in the Communist party hierarchy and were channeled by that hierarchy.

There were in the Northern Caucasus two really frightening and blood-shedding conflicts - the eviction of Ingushes from the Prigorodnyi Raion of North Ossetia and the Chechenian War. They were more numerous in Transcaucasia (in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and in Nagorno-Karabagh), but this was because the local governments of the newly independent states (sometimes labeled as mini-empires) of Georgia and Azerbaidjan were extremely week and irresponsible and gave temporary freedom of action to political adventurers (although in the case of the Chechenian war a similar accusation can be made regarding Yeltsin's administration as well).

On the other hand we have seen that there were many more places, where there was a danger of acute conflict, but luckily it did not occur. Undoubtedly it was not just mere luck, but very probably there were some mechanisms which preventied activie ethnic conflicts, and did not allow many of them to develop to the point of no return.

It may be a cynical statement but still it must be pronounced, that a continuity of power, when it remains in the hands of reconverted old party bosses helps to maintain the social order. Conflicts arise when the former leaders are too weak to regain power - like in Transcaucasia or Chechenia.

Some voluntary organizations may play an important role but it is limited. Despite the general criminal chaos that reigned in many parts of Chechenia in 1992-1993, a Council of Inter-Ethnic Reconciliation, a non-Government volunteer organization, was instrumental in minimizing many local conflicts, but it could not, of course, prevent the big conflict, when Russian secret services decided to intervene in such a clumsy way.

An extraordinarily important, though often invisible, peace making role was played in Chechenia and especially in Daghestan by Islamic Sufi orders, which acted across ethnic boundaries and reconciled the conflicting ethnic groups through their members within these groups.

Generally the efforts for ethnic reconciliation made by the Islamic clergy and by traditional village elders are also very important. Sometimes these people are accused of the contrary, of igniting the conflicts, and this is absolutely unfair. These mechanisms helped to prevent an intensification of the Balkar-Kabardin conflict, and they helped to prevent young Ingushes from massive participation on behalf of Chechenians against federal troops in the recent war.

However almost all enumerated mechanisms are efficient only in a more or less conservative and traditional society, which respects traditions, leaders and elders. The more traditional a society is, the better these mechanisms work.

But today, in many societies in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in previously traditional regions, a number of young men have grown up with no respect for traditional values. And in this case, the further to the West the territory is located, the higher the percentage of such people.

Therefore the danger of new conflicts is growing in just those areas where ethnic tensions have always been traditionally weaker, rather than in the Eastern parts of the Northern Caucasus.

But if we may risk a few predictions, they can be reduced to a statement, that future conflicts are going to be more and more of a social and not of an ethnic nature. The possibility can not be denied that there may be large scale criminal violence, and that it will be channeled by some dishonest politicians into mass riots of a political character, but we should hardly expect many ethnic clashes in the near future. The people in the Caucasus seem to be fed up with them, and the voices of nationalist extremists seem to find today a less and less receptive audience. It does not mean that the national cause is totally discredited as an idea; on the contrary, the search for identity, the search for ways to a further affirmation of identity, continues and will continue, but hopefully not in the direction of increasing ethnic violence and hatred, not by invention of jingoist mythologies and unreasonable claims. It is still the task of the future for the nations of the Caucasus to find such national leaders, who could formulate decent democratic perspectives of their national development, not at the price of suppression or eviction of other groups, but through an increase in national constructive activity.

SRC Winter Symposium Socio-Cultural Dimensions of the Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World ( English / Japanese )