

Russian Policy toward Islamic “Sacred Lineages” of Samarkand Province of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship in 1868–1917

Azim Malikov

INTRODUCTION

Historians have pondered the methods and means for the inclusion of a territory with various systems of social organization into the structure of the Russian Empire.¹ In this regard, a special interest is represented by the study of the Russian Empire’s policy in relation to the Muslim religious elites of Central Asia.

In the past, Muslim religious elites played a significant role in the public life of the people of Central Asia. The leading role in economic and religious life of the region was played by the *ulama*, whose highest layer was represented by “holy groups”² or sacred lineages³ as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad or the first four Caliphs.

Some “sacred lineages” fulfilled important religious and social duties in pre-Soviet Central Asian society (before 1917) and were held in very high esteem by everyone.⁴ Members of these lineages performed religious services at ritual celebrations, acted as healers, and helped settle disputes. Some were also the caretakers of Sufi shrines.⁵ The sacred lineages formed part of the Central Asian aristocracy called *oq suyak* (white bone) in contrast to the *qoracha* (black, common people). To understand the place of the religious elite, it is necessary to take into account that the *ulama*, most of whom were from “sacred lineages,” monopolized the possession of knowledge of Muslim laws, and of the resolution of legal and religious issues.

1 Andreas Kappeler, *Rossiiā—mnogonatsional’naia imperia. Vozniknovenie, istoriia, raspad* (Moscow, 1997), p. 9.

2 The terms “sacred lineage” and “holy group” are used here to refer to privileged descendant groups that have a high social status in society and claim to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, his companions, the first Caliphs, and Sufi saints.

3 A lineage is usually taken to mean a group of people who trace unilineal descent from a common ancestor through a series of links that can be enumerated. Ladislav Holy, *Anthropological Perspectives on Kinship* (London: Pluto Press, 1998), pp. 74–75.

4 Olga Sukhareva, *Islam v Uzbekistane* (Tashkent, 1960), pp. 66–68.

5 Devin DeWeese, “Foreword,” in Ashirbek Muminov, Anke von Kügelgen, Devin DeWeese, and Michael Kemper, eds., *Islamization and Sacred Lineages in Central Asia. The Legacy of Ishaq Bab in Narrative and Genealogical Traditions, vol. 2: Genealogical Charters and Sacred Families: Nasab-namas and Khoja Groups Linked to the Ishaq Bab Narrative, 19th–21st Centuries* (Almaty: Daik Press, 2008), pp. 6–33.

Sacred families used various self-names that depended on the regional and cultural contexts. Researchers call them by the generic term “descendants of saints” (*awlad-i awliya*).⁶ In the definition of “sacred lineages,” there are various opinions based on differing criteria. The *sayyids* consist of people who claim to have a direct patrilineal descent from the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima. *Sayyids* have enjoyed a privileged position in almost all Islamic countries. In Muslim societies, “the terms and definitions of who belonged to the family of the Prophet (*Ahl al-Bayt*) were fluid and flexible.”⁷ According to Sunni scholars, one hadith indicates that loving and honoring *Ahl al-Bayt* is a religious duty.⁸

Different groups of *khoja*, *khwaja* (meaning “master” in Persian) use various explanations for their origin. Some *khoja* groups are believed to be the descendants of the first four Caliphs, namely, Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali (excluding his descendants from Fatima, the daughter of Prophet Muhammad), whereas other groups claim to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. *Ishan*, which means “they” in Persian, is a title or nickname in Central Asia that was given to leaders (of diverse levels) of Sufi brotherhoods and their descendants.

The present study aimed to examine the Islamic “sacred lineages” (*sayyid*, *khoja*, *ishan*) of the Samarkand province under the Turkestan Governor-Generalship in 1868–1917.⁹ This research explored the effect of Russian policies on *khoja* and *sayyid* groups in Samarkand province, which have not been explored separately. My choice of the Samarkand province as the object of my research is far from random. Samarkand had the greatest significance of symbolizing the local population of Islamic sacredness, and the former greatness of being the capital of Timur. The Samarkand region was one of the biggest religious centers in Central Asia with a concentration of a large number of *khojas* and *sayyids* of various lineages. The Samarkand region bordered one of the crucial centers of Islam in Central Asia, the Emirate of Bukhara. Naturally, the influ-

6 Ashirbek Muminov, *Rodoslovnnoe drevo Mukhtara Auezova* (Almaty, 2011), p. 26.

7 Teresa Bernheimer, “Genealogy, Marriage, and the Drawing of Boundaries Among the ‘Alids (eighth–twelfth centuries)” in Kazuo Morimoto, ed., *Sayyids and Sharifs in Muslim Societies: The Living Links to the Prophet* (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 77.

8 Fareeha Khan, “Ahl al-Bayt,” *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam and Law*.
<http://oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t349/e0162>

9 Some ethnographic data from the Bukhara region were collected during my field trips in 2011 with financial and scientific support from the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. Archival and scientific data relating to Samarkand Province were analyzed with scientific and financial support from the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center of Hokkaido University in 2017–2018. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Tomohiko Uyama for the scientific support. I am grateful to the participants of the Pre-symposium Workshop: Wars and Transformation of Social Order: Russia’s Conquest of Central Asia and the Caucasus, which was held at the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center of Hokkaido University. I also thank the anonymous reviewers who provided comments and remarks on my paper.

ence of the Bukharan clergy on the Samarkand ulama was considerable. Meanwhile, many Russian officials had an exaggerated fear of Bukhara, believing it to be a center of fanaticism. One of the main features of Samarkand was that it was home to a large number of shrines, to which a great number of inhabitants made a pilgrimage. In the Muslim world, Samarkand was known as one of the centers of Islam and Islamic education. Sufi orders and their leaders or *ishans* of the Samarkand region had an influence not only in the Zarafshan Valley but also beyond it, namely, the Syr-Darya region, Hissar, and Tashkent.

The main outcome of the Russian policy toward Islam and the sacred lineages was the destruction of Sufi groups and confiscation of waqf property. However, the most important change was that descent from saints gradually lost the privileged position it had in the pre-Russian period. This study analyzed archival documents relating to the "sacred lineages" of the Samarkand and Kattakurgan districts in the Samarkand region. The analysis excluded the archival materials on the "sacred lineages" of Jizzakh and Khodjent districts of Samarkand Province. A considerable role in the implementation of policy was played by Russian educational and cultural officials of the Samarkand region, through their communication with higher structures of the Russian Empire. Documents from the Central State archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan (*fonds* [collections]: I-1 – Kantseliariia Turkestanakogo general-gubernatora; I-5 – Kantseliariia nachal'nika Zeravshanskogo okruga; I-17 – Sirdar'inskoe oblastnoe pravlenie; I-18 – Samarkandskoe oblastnoe pravlenie; I-20 – Upravlenie nachal'nika Samarkandskogo uezda Samarkandskoi oblasti; I-22 – Upravlenie nachal'nika Kattakurganskogo uezda Samarkandskoi oblasti; I-36 – Upravlenie nachal'nika goroda Tashkenta; I-172 – Peishambinskii uchastkovyi pristav Kattakurganskogo uyezda Samarkandskoi oblasti) and publications on the newspaper *Turkestanskii Vedomosti* were the main sources of the research. Analysis of existing sources indicated the necessity of separating descendants of sacred lineages from the clergy, as the population believed that the sacred lineages had a particular sacred power and charisma. Influential families had privileges that were inherited through generations.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW

The existing research concerning sacred lineages of Central Asia can be conditionally divided into three groups: publications of the orientalist of the Russian Empire; publications of Soviet orientalist and ethnographers; and post-Soviet research of scholars of different disciplines: orientalist, historians, ethnologists. In the present work, there is no opportunity to analyze in detail all the points of view related to the history of sacred lineages of Central Asia in the period of the Russian Empire. Nonetheless, this study recognizes the importance of showing what main discourses had already been stated and which groups had been researched. Using the chronological frame, the present work analyzed the publications in which the question of imperial policy concerning the local elite was raised.

Orientalist Nikolai Khanikov pioneered the classification of “sacred lineages,” allocated to the sacred families that had political influence in the Emirate of Bukhara.¹⁰ The origin of *khojas*, their genealogy, and their role in the political life of the Central Asian khanates were all raised by the famous orientalist V. Bartold, who considered that the genealogical records of *khojas* had obvious traces of forgery.¹¹ The study of “sacred families” as a part of government of the Bukharan Emirate was conducted by A. Semenov, who distinguished between the *ulama* and the followers of Sufism.¹²

An ethnographic study of local groups of *khojas* based on the concept of ethnos was carried out by O. Sukhareva¹³ (Samarkand and Bukhara) and B. Karmysheva (southern Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). S. Abashin studied the sacred lineages of Ferghana Valley and the relationships between them; he considered “sacred lineages” of the Ferghana Valley as a part of the large group of “descendants of saints” in Central Asia.¹⁴

A group of orientalists analyzed the genealogical legends of “sacred lineages” and the principles of constructing their genealogies, which were studied as a source on Islamization, legitimization of the elites, and the history of the region.¹⁵ D. Arapov analyzed the documents developed by the highest circles of the Russian Empire on the policy in Turkestan and attitudes toward Islam.¹⁶ A. Khalid examined the features of pre-Russian Muslim society in detail, its transformation, and the appearance of Islamic reformers in Central Asia. The problem of Islam in Russian politics in Turkestan was analyzed by R. Crews.¹⁷

10 Nikolai Khanikov, *Opisanie Bukharskogo khanstva* (St. Petersburg, 1843), pp. 181–182.

11 Vasilii Bartold, *Sochineniia* 2/1 (Moscow, 1963), p. 276.

12 Aleksandr Semenov, *Ocherk ustroistva tsentral'nogo administrativnogo upravleniia Bukharskogo khanstva pozdneishego vremeni: Materialy po istorii tadjikov i uzbekov Srednei Azii*, vyp. 2 (Stalinabad, 1954), p. 16.

13 Olga Sukhareva, *Islam v Uzbekistane* (Tashkent, 1960).

14 Sergei Abashin, “Potomki sviatykh v sovremennoi Srednei Azii,” *Etnograficheskoe obozrenie* 4 (2001), pp. 62–83.

15 Devin DeWeese, “The Politics of sacred Lineages in 19th-Century Central Asia: Descent Groups Linked to Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi in Shrine Documents and Genealogical Charters,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 31:4 (1999), pp. 507–530; Ashirbek Muminov, *Rodoslovnnoe drevo Mukhtara Auezova* (Almaty, 2011); Alfrid Bustanov, “The Texts of Siberian Khwāja Families: The Descendants of Sayyid Ata,” *Journal of Islamic Manuscripts* 2:1 (2011), pp. 70–99; Yayoi Kawahara, *Private Archives on a Makhdumzada Family in Marghilan* (Tokyo: NIHU Program Islamic Area Studies TIAS, 2012), p. vii; and Kazuo Morimoto, “Keeping the Prophet’s Family Alive: Profile of a Genealogical Discipline,” in Sarah Bowen Savant and Helena de Felipe, eds., *Genealogy and Knowledge in Muslim Societies: Understanding the Past* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), pp. 11–23.

16 Dmitrii Arapov, *Sistema gosudarstvennogo regulirovaniia islama v Rossiiskoi imperii: posledniaia tret' XVIII – nachalo XX vv.* (Moscow, 2004).

17 Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Robert Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

A number of T. Uyama's publications are devoted to the study of the issues in the history of Turkestan and the Kazakh steppe in the period of the Russian Empire.¹⁸ B. Babadzhanov's research on the imperial policy of the Russian Empire in the Turkestan Governor-Generalship revealed that the policy for "sacred lineages" was contradictory.¹⁹

A. Morrison, using the example of the Samarkand region, studied the principles of adapting the Bukhara land tenure system to the system introduced by Russians.²⁰ He also analyzed the role of orientalists in the formulation of Russian policy in the region. He aimed to identify the factors that influenced Russian policy toward Muslims in Central Asia. The publications of Sartori analyzed, a number of questions connected with the problems of Islam, Sharia, transformation of the judicial system, and features of Islamic reformism in Turkestan in the period of the Russian Empire.²¹

The present study makes it possible to look at "sacred lineages" in a specific region that could win or lose from changes and had their own trajectory of adaptation to the new system of political organization, economic relations, cultural environment, and modernization process. In the transformation of the status of "sacred lineages," it is possible to observe not only the external influence of Russian colonialism but also the internal logic on the transformation of the Muslim world. This process is complex, controversial, involves many factors, and not reducible to a single scheme of positive or negative consequences.

Over the last decades, the archival revolution contributed to the study of a large number of documents from the archival funds of the Russian Empire period.²² On the basis of new data, it is now possible to look at the problems of the imperial history of Turkestan from a completely different angle. It is possible, likewise, to talk about the general strategy of Russian authorities in Turkestan; nonetheless, the implementation of this policy in the regions had its own specifics depending on local conditions. Documents reveal one important feature: certain differences in the policy of the authorities depending on local contexts, namely, economic development, structure of the population, geographic location, identity of the officials, as well as external factors, including

18 Tomohiko Uyama, "Introduction, Asiatic Russia as a Space for a Asymmetric Interaction," in Tomohiko Uyama, ed., *Asiatic Russia: Imperial Power in Regional and International Contexts* (London: Routledge, 2012).

19 Bakhtiiar Babadzhanov, "Andizhanskoe vosstanie 1898 goda i 'musul'manskii vopros' v Turkestane (vzgliady 'kolonizatorov' i 'kolonizirovannykh')," *Ab Imperio* 2 (2009), pp. 155–200.

20 Alexander Morrison, "Amläkdärs, Khwājas and Mulk land in the Zarafshan Valley after the Russian Conquest," in Paolo Sartori, ed., *Explorations in the Social History of Modern Central Asia (19th – Early 20th Century)* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 23–64.

21 Paolo Sartori, *Visions of Justice: Sharia and Cultural Change in Russian Central Asia* (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

22 Uyama, "Introduction," p. 1.

situations in neighboring countries and the relations of the Russian Empire with the Ottoman Empire and the Emirate of Bukhara.

It is important to identify factors that influenced the directions of Russian policy toward Islam and the transformation of “sacred lineages” as a symbolic capital of the presence of Islam in the region. Two trends are important: 1) the state policy toward Islam; 2) the process of modernization in the Russian Empire that started to intensify in the 1880s.

2. HISTORICAL REVIEW

In the middle of the 19th century, the Emirate of Bukhara had a population of approximately 2.5 million residents, consisting of a sedentary and semi-nomadic population of Uzbeks whose tribal elites made up much of the governing class, sedentary Tajiks, Irani, Jews, Arabs, “sacred lineages,” and nomadic Turkmen and Kazakhs. Most of the Bukharans were Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi tradition.

Some “sacred lineages” had certain monopoly in the field of Islamic jurisprudence, or knowledge of Islam. In the state apparatus of Bukhara, *shaykh al-Islam* was considered a special position. The *shaykh al-Islam* particularly examined the complaints and statements concerning the *nasab*, or the genealogy of “sacred families.” Semenov supposed that the biggest part of ulama originated from *sayyids*, *mirs*, and *khojas*. The powerful position of *Rais*, who monitored the execution of religious practices and ethical standards, was always taken by representatives of the lineage of *sayyids*.²³ The oasis of Bukhara was under direct administration of amir, whereas other provinces were governed by officials called *beks*. There was a *qazi* or a judge in each province. He reported to the *Qazi kalan* (chief judge of the state). *Qazis* were appointed by the *amir*, who made decisions by consulting with representatives of the higher clergy,²⁴ which in turn consisted of representatives of “sacred lineages.” In some cases, members of powerful sacred lineages were connected to the *amirs* through marriage alliances. The Makhdum-i Azamis and Ahraris were patronized by rulers, who frequently visited their shrines and donated large sums of money.²⁵ *Waqf* was a permanent endowment of property, a source of income for mosques, *madrasas*, shrines, *khanaqas*, and “sacred lineages.” Many *waqfs* were under the control of the members of “sacred lineages” and the *amir*.

23 Aleksandr Semenov, “Ocherk ustroistva tsentral’nogo administrativnogo upravleniia Bukharskogo khanstva pozdneishego vremeni,” *Materialy po istorii tadjikov i uzbekov Srednei Azii*, vyp. 2 (Stalinabad, 1954), pp. 45, 67.

24 T. V. Kotiukova, ed., *Turkestan v imperskoi politike Rossii: Monografiia v dokumentakh* (Moscow, 2016), p. 227.

25 Andreas Wilde, *The Emirate of Bukhara*.

<http://asianhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277727-e-14> (accessed February 1, 2019).

Ranks and titles were granted by rulers as markers of status and authority. For "sacred lineages," there were other attributes, such as claim to sacred lineage and reputation for piety. Kinship was an important factor that contributed to the existence of "sacred lineages" and an ulama network. The sons of scholars often adopted the profession of their fathers. This tradition was destroyed among some families of *ulama* in the Bukharan oasis after the Russian invasion owing to economic reasons.²⁶

The "sacred lineages" have some traits that distinguish this group from the rest of the population. Frequently, members of these families add the titles of *khoja*, *sayyid*, or *khon*.²⁷ For non-*khoja* and non-*sayyid* men, it was not possible to become a member of a *sayyid* or *khoja* descent group who had hereditary rights. Genealogy was the main legal and symbolic document for sacred lineages, which granted rights; in certain cases, it was confirmation of the special status of the sacred lineage.²⁸

During the Russian conquest of the Emirate of Bukhara, the *ulama*²⁹ and *ishans* played a significant role in the struggle against the Russian forces, attempting to use religion as a consolidating factor in resistance. One of the most important figures was Umar Khwaja of Dahbid (14 km northwest of Samarkand), a descendant of outstanding theologian and famous Sufi leader Ahmad Kasani Makhdumi Azam (1461–1542).³⁰ In 1889, two thirds of population of Daghbit consisted of *khojas*,³¹ mostly the descendants of Makhdumi Azam.³² Makhdumi Azam's descendants had a known political and social influence not only in Samarkand but also in the Kokand khanate and Western China in the 19th century.³³ Makhdumi Azam had 13 sons, each of whom became progenitors of *khoja* lineages among the Tajiks, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Uyghurs.

26 Interview with a descendant of Sayyid ata Khoja lineage, Bukhara, March 2011.

27 Muminov, *Rodoslovnnoe drevo Mukhtara Auezova*, p. 27.

28 Sukhareva, *Islam v Uzbekistane*, pp. 66–68.

29 Mirza Abdalazim Sami, ed., *Tarikh-i Salatin-i Mangitiia (istoriia mangytskikh gosudarei)* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 61–62.

30 Azim Malikov, "The Russian Conquest of the Bukharan Emirate: Military and Diplomatic Aspects," *Central Asian Survey* 33:2 (2014), pp. 180–198.

31 Georgii Arendarenko, "Neskol'ko dnei na ozere Kurchuk-ata," *Turkestanskii vedomosti* 2 (1889).

32 Nikolai Veselovskii, "Dagbid," *Zapiski vostochnogo otdeleniia imperatorskogo russkogo arheologicheskogo obshchestva* 3 (1888), p. 88.

33 Iaioi Kavakhara, "«Sviatye semeistva» Margelana v Kokandskom khanstve v XIX v.," *Pax Islamica* 4 (2010), pp. 123, 137.

3. CLASSIFICATION OF “SACRED LINEAGES” IN DISCOURSES OF RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATION

In Central Asia, one can find various classifications of “sacred lineages.” In documents, the descendants of famous Sufi leaders are mentioned as among the most well-known *khoja* families in Samarkand: Khoja Akhrar, Sayyid-ata, Makhdumi Azam, Khoja Ahmad Yassavi, and Khoja Mirakoni.³⁴ Descendants of the saints can be divided into two groups: local and translocal. The latter, having higher status, can be found in different parts of Turkestan. “A translocal community relates to a group of (translocal) households, whose members live in diverse locations, which are connected through functional interdependencies.”³⁵ In the pre-Soviet period (before 1917), the translocal communications of “sacred lineages” persisted through a network of Sufi brotherhoods (Naqshbandiya, Yassaviya), in which local leaders had high moral and religious status. Brotherhoods covered extensive territories.³⁶ It is necessary to emphasize that there was no uniform classification of “sacred lineages” among the Muslim population of Turkestan. The use of any particular title or prefix to the names depended on the context, the regional and cultural specifics. As S. Abashin noted, Makhdumi Azam’s descendants in Kashgar considered themselves as *sayyids*, and were *ishans* formally, but in written tradition, they were called *khojas*, although among people they were more known as *tura*.³⁷

Diverse pictures of *khojas*’ emic identification depended on geographic, social and cultural specifics of the regions. According to old scholars of *khoja* descent, *khojas* differentiated the various groups of *khojas* as follows: “Those who were born as *khoja* and those who became *khoja*” (*khoja nasabi* and *khoja hasabi*). The term “*khoja hasabi*” implies the people who became *khojas* because of Sufi activities. They did not belong to sacred lineages in the strict sense of this word.³⁸ Meanwhile, family ties, marriages between sacred lineages, and differences between these groups from others with whom marriages had not been welcomed before are important factors as well.³⁹ Representatives of the

34 Thomas Welsford and Nouryaghdi Tashev, *A Catalogue of Arabic-Script Documents from the Samarkand Museum with the Assistance of Masudxon Ismoilov and Hamidulla Aminov* (Samarkand, 2012), p. 458.

35 Beate Lohnert and Malte Steinbrink, “Rural and Urban Livelihoods: A Translocal Perspective in a South African Context,” *South African Geographical Journal* 87:2 (2005), p. 98.

36 Azim Malikov, “Sacred Lineages in Central Asia: Translocality and Identity,” in Manja Stephan-Emmrich and Philipp Schröder, eds., *Mobilities, Boundaries, and Travelling Ideas: Rethinking Translocality Beyond Central Asia and the Caucasus* (Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2018), pp. 121–150.

37 Sergei Abashin, “Sufism v Srednei Azii: tochka zrenia etnografa,” *Vestnik Evrazii* 4:4 (2001), p. 135.

38 Interviews with intellectual, descendant of Sayyid ata Khoja group, 55 years old. Bukhara, March 2011.

39 Interview with intellectual, descendant of Makhdumi Azam, 60 years old. Samarkand, April 2011.

most famous families of "sacred lineages" indicated that the most revered ones were the *sayyids*.

To understand the characteristics of Russians policy, it is important to analyze the perception of the Russian authorities regarding the local societies. Notably, there may be different and changeable images of the same group.⁴⁰ Officials of the administration of Samarkand province had different contradictory views on the essence and origin of the "sacred lineages." Most non-Russian groups inhabiting Turkestan were designated *inorodtsy* (aliens) or *tuzemtsy* (natives). Archival data showed the ambivalence inherent in the state classifications of its subjects in Samarkand province.

Russian officials at the time considered ethnic and class concepts to be closely related. J. Cadiot argued that in Turkestan, administrators were confronted with unknown categories and groups, and attempted to find simple categories.⁴¹ This may explain why, in the Samarkand censuses of 1872–1888, the *khoja* and *mirs* were singled out. Later, they completely disappeared from the census. A comparison of the archival documents relating to the sacred lineages in Tashkent and Samarkand showed that the large population of Tashkent and the lineages of the city were reflected in numerous mentions of *khojas* and their interactions with the Russian authorities. For example, in a document dated 1887, *khojas* were identified as a separate group from the urban population. The document referred to "*khojas* and inhabitants of the Sebzar district" of Tashkent.⁴²

Administration officials of Samarkand adhered to different contradictory views on entities and origin of "sacred lineages." For example, according to a document in 1868 made by the chief of Zarafshan district, A. Abramov, *khojas* were called descendants of the Prophet Muhammad or his relatives. The document noted that *khojas* particularly attempted to seduce the population and to arm it against the government.⁴³ The chief of Kattakurgan district, A. Grebenkin, claimed that in Zarafshan district, there are actually no *khojas*, everyone calling himself *khoja* is an impostor.⁴⁴

In contrast, according to Samarkand chancery chief L. Sobolev in 1873, it was possible to find *khojas* in different districts and villages of Samarkand region. In the census, the following *khojas* were mentioned: Uzbek *Khojas*, Uzbek-aqsuiak-*Khojas*, Bakhtaish-*Khojas*, *Khojas*, and Mirakan-*Khojas*. Among *khojas*, identified in Zarafshan okrug, there were the following: 1) Aq-suiak Kho-

40 Tomohiko Uyama, "Mutual Relations and Perceptions of Russians and Central Asians: Preliminary Notes for Comparative Imperial Studies," in Tomohiko Uyama, ed., *Empire and After: Essays in Comparative Imperial and Decolonization Studies* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2012), p. 19.

41 Juliet Kadio, *Laboratoriia imperii: Rossiia/SSSR, 1860–1940* (Moscow, 2010), pp. 17, 82–84.

42 TsGA RUz, f. I-17, op. 1, d. 20477, l. 2.

43 TsGA RUz, f. I-22, op. 1, d. 1402, l. 17.

44 *Turkestanskije vedomosti* (November 29, 1871).

ja, descendants of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiya arrived from Khujand (modern northern Tajikistan); 2) Aq-suiek-Khoja, or the Kazakhs, descendants of the Awliya'-Ata, arrived from Qarnak, not far from Turkestan (modern southern Kazakhstan); 3) Khoja-bakhshaiish, descendants of saint Khorasan-Ata, arrived from Dasht-i Qipchak; and 4) Khoja, the descendants of Khoja Ahmad Yassavi, arrived from Turkestan.⁴⁵

After Dukchi Ishan's uprising in 1898, local police officers received instructions to register sacred lineages and to give more detailed information on them. For example, the Peyshanba district police officer of Kattakurgan district of Samarkand region, by preparing lists of the population in 1907, collected data from waqf documents and listed the eminent sacred families: descendants of Ismail Khoja's in the village of Dur-bibish, descendants of Makhdumi Azam in Samarkand, descendants of Hassan-ata, and descendants of the Junaydulla Khalif in Charkhi.⁴⁶

Thus, weak knowledge of the Russian officials on local ethnography and Islam led to the emergence of various, at times contradictory, discourses on sacred families. Russian authorities attempted to combine the "sacred lineages" with a more common ethnic, tribal classification of the population, laying the foundations for the destruction of the individual class status of this group, which often had a supra-ethnic status.

4. TRANSFORMATION OF WAQF AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS

Russian policy in the region was determined by various interrelated factors: the human factor, indicating the identity of Russian officials and their interaction with the local elite; the policy of military governors and their status and weight in relations with the Turkestan Governor-General.

The approach to Muslim clerics in Turkestan took shape in 1868 under the first governor-general of Russian Turkestan, K. P. von Kaufman (1818–1882), who argued that the best way to weaken Islam was to ignore its institutions; however, these institutions had been brought under state control. There were several discourses on the role of Islam in Russian Turkestan. The first was the Islamophobic discourse, which was more widespread among the highest administration circles of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship. An important role in it was played by the activities in Islam and Islamic modernism of N. Ostroumov, who was also close to the authorities.⁴⁷ Babadzhanov considered that not all the views of N. Ostroumov were accepted by the colonial administration.⁴⁸

45 Leonid Sobolev, "Geographicheskie i statisticheskie svedeniia o Zarafshanskom okruge s prilozheniem spiska naselennykh mest okruga," *Zapiski imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva po otdeleniiu statistiki* 4 (1874), pp. 163–681.

46 TsGA RUz, f. I-172, op. 1, d. 152., l. 29ab, 33ab, 34ab.

47 Alexander Morrison, "'Applied Orientalism' in British India and Tsarist Turkestan," *Comparative Studies in Society & History* 51:3 (2009), pp. 619–647.

48 Bakhtiar Babadzhanov, "Nikolai Ostroumov: 'missioner', 'islamoved', 'tsivilizator'?" *Vostok svyshe* 32 (2014), pp. 32, 43–44.

There were also pragmatic views of Muslim society that were less widespread. For example, one of the administrators favored the use of the values of the Muslim population for the benefit of Russian power.⁴⁹

The fear of Islam remained a constant component of policies toward Muslim people through the Imperial period, although its intensity varied with the political situation. According to Morrison, the Russians created their land revenue system and sought to break the power both of Uzbek tribal and religious elites, namely, the *sayyids* and *khojas*.⁵⁰ The fact that Turkestan was subordinate to the Military Ministry from the very beginning of its formation to the revolution of 1917 greatly influenced the methods of management, which were based on military principles. According to Brower, it was all well and good to use Muslim "fanaticism" as an argument for authoritarian governance.⁵¹

In Turkestan under Russian rule, the authorities ceased to be Islamic, and all higher Islamic positions, such as *Qazi kalon*, *Rais*, and *Shaykh-al-Islam*, were abolished. Thus, high positions, which were mainly occupied by representatives of "sacred lineages," were abolished. The policy of "ignoring" Islam also included measures for the limiting of the spread of Muslim propaganda on the Kazakhs, partial secularization of waqf lands, prohibition of new *waqf*, and obstruction of the establishment of Turkestan's own *muftiat* (a state-controlled religious administration).

During the era of the Emirate of Bukhara, arising disputes on written genealogies of sacred families had been settled by the *Shaykh-al-Islam*, who, on the basis of a special analysis of experts, decided whether the genealogy was original or not. During the Russian regime, such institute did not exist; Russian orientalist often claimed that many genealogies were fake.

Khalid noted that the policy of "ignoring" Muslim institutions laid the foundations for an often "paradoxical administrative policy."⁵² In May 1868, K. Kaufman himself broke the bases of non-interference policy into the affairs of religious institutes when he designated as the chief judge of Samarkand the mufti Kamaladdin, who did not belong to a sacred lineage based on his lack of a title of *khoja*, *tura*, *sayyid*, or *mir*. Probably, in the face of the continuing war with the *amir* of Bukhara, Kaufman positioned himself as a strong administrator and wanted to demonstrate his power to the Muslim population. In a letter to the residents of Bukhara dated May 7, 1868, K. Kaufman announced that with the arrival of Russians in Samarkand, inhabitants could freely continue

49 A. Termen, *Vospominaniia administratora: Opyt issledovaniia printsipov upravleniia inorodtsev* (Petrograd, 1914), pp. 19–20.

50 Morrison, "Amläkdärs, Khwājas and Mulk land in the Zarafshan Valley after the Russian Conquest," pp. 23–64.

51 Daniel Brower, *Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 105.

52 Adeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 53.

praying in mosques and bringing legal proceedings under Sharia.⁵³ Kaufman appointed *qazis* in rural areas as well, for example, in Urguts, but again, appointees were not persons originating from “sacred lineages.”⁵⁴ P. Sartori, using documents from Tashkent, showed that some Russian officials in the 1870s felt a fear of *ishans*; therefore, they opposed the latter’s election as judges, or even demanded the cancellation of the results of elections in case influential *ishans* or their descendants were chosen.⁵⁵ Officials in Tashkent insisted that in elections to village and volost (an administrative subdivision in Russian Empire) managements, the judge should rule that politically unreliable individuals are not elected.⁵⁶

The Samarkand judge, Kamaladdin, was faithful toward the Russian authorities and retained his position even after the Samarkand uprising of 1868. As he was appointed, he endeavored to demonstrate his loyalty to the new power and his “modernity” through the imitation of Russian customs. Later, Kamaladdin was fired for violations and corruption. V. Nalivkin wrote that local Muslims did not consider such people to be their kin and labeled them as *chukundi* (baptized).⁵⁷ After his discharge, Kamaladdin returned to the “traditional” way of life of a Muslim. Subsequently, Muslim judges began to be elected. From 1874 to 1894, the representative of a sacred family, a descendant of Makhdumi Azam named Nizam ad-Din Khoja Abdugaffarov, was repeatedly elected as judge. He closely cooperated with local authorities, but his behavior strongly differed from Kamaladdin’s in the fact that he continued to lead “a Muslim lifestyle.” In 1880, the Russian authorities decided to destroy the mausoleum of the 13th-century Sufi Nur ad-Din Basir in the Temurid fortress. With the permission of the authorities, Nizam ad-Din Khoja managed to move the remains of the Sufi from the mausoleum to the cemetery around Khazrat Hizr mosque before the destruction and erected the dome over it.⁵⁸ Consequently, this initiative reinforced the authority of the *qazi* among the population.

In the first years after the occupation of the region, the authorities admitted to maneuvering in relationships with the Muslim clergy. After the conquest of the Khivan and Kokand khanates, the authorities took a more rigid position. Importantly, many of the members of “sacred families” occupied important state positions in the khanates, such as ambassadors, and therefore, they were highly influential.

The Russian authorities were afraid of the power and influence of the representatives of sacred lineages who had a higher status. Therefore, in the 1870s,

53 TsGA RUz, f. I-1, op. 34, d. 8, l. 177. Snosheniia s Bukharoi general-ad”utanta K. Kaufmana.

54 TsGA RUz, f. I-1, op. 34, d. 8, l. 181. Snosheniia s Bukharoi general-ad”utanta K. Kaufmana.

55 Paolo Sartori, “Judicial Elections as a Colonial Reform: The Qadis and Biys in Tashkent, 1868–1883,” *Cahiers du monde russe* 49:1 (2008), p. 87.

56 TsGA RUz, f. I-17, op. 1, d. 20477, l. 3ab. Raport ot 16 ianvaria 1887 goda.

57 Vladimir Nalivkin, *Tuzemtsy: ran’she i teper’: etnograficheskie ocherki o tiurko-mongol’skom naselenii Turkestanskogo kraia* (Moscow, 2012).

58 N. I. Veselovskii, *Samariia: Sochinenie Abu-Takhir-hodzhi. Tadzhitskii tekst* (St. Peterburg, 1904), pp. VII–XII.

at populous official meetings of people in public places, authorities preferred to select representatives of non-elite clergy (i.e., not belonging to "sacred lineages") for ideological propaganda purposes. Thus, for example, in February 1871, during the *Eid al-Fitr* celebrations at the Samarkand Registan, the 90-year-old old mullah Pirnazar delivered a speech in which he said that the White Tsar accepted locals to come under Russian protection and saved locals from their oppressed situation, in which they had been for 500 years. He noted that the Bukhara *amirs*, in spite of the fact of being Muslims, turned out to be worse than *kafirs* (infidel, unbeliever). He emphasized that the Russians had brought order to the country, and called for action: "Raise your hands and plead God [for the] health of the White Tsar, governor-general, and his assistants." This experience of a prayer of a local population for the White Tsar and the governor general was also introduced across the entire Zarafshan district.⁵⁹

Russian policy was to support a pluralistic legal regime in Turkestan.⁶⁰ Russian authorities introduced the appointment of judges by election to three-year terms.⁶¹ The office of judges was called *qazis* (from 1886, they were renamed *narodnye sud'i* or people's judges).⁶² *Qazi* did not receive a salary from the state, but they had vast authority, and control of their activities was minimized. It was difficult to inspect a *qazi*, who handed down decisions stating that the punishment was instructed by Sharia.⁶³ According to Crews, Russian officials "became critical actors in religious disputes intervening in conflicts dividing neighborhoods in Samarkand and they also mediated disputes among Muslims."⁶⁴ In cases of conflicts, such as divorce, women from "sacred families" addressed their requests to the Russian authorities.⁶⁵ However, according to Nalivkin's observations, the Russian court itself managed to become irrelevant in the eyes of the population during this time. For example, the local population were bewildered by events where the same case received various decisions in different instances.⁶⁶

Among the most important resources of "sacred families" were *waqf* assets and property, especially lands (*milks*) that were not subject to taxation. Initially, the local administration took *awlad-waqf* or hereditary *waqf* lands that had served as sources of income for entire dynasties of "sacred lineages" (or-

59 M. Bogdanov, "Iz Samarkanda," *Turkestanskije vedomosti* 3 (1871).

60 Sartori, "Judicial Elections as a Colonial Reform," p. 79.

61 Nadira Abdurakhimova, "The Colonial System of Power in Turkistan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34:2 (2002), p. 240.

62 Alexander Morrison, *Russian Rule in Samarkand. 1868–1910: A Comparison with British India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 259, 264.

63 Kotiukova, et al. eds., *Turkestan v imperskoj politike Rossii: monografija v dokumentakh*, pp. 227, 234.

64 Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia*, p. 258.

65 TsGA RUz, f. I-18, op. 1, d. 61.

66 Nalivkin, *Tuzemtsy ran'she i teper'*, p. 96.

dinary *milk* lands), because it was persons and not organizations that profited from them. Kaufman's land reform aimed at weakening strong Muslim religious institutions. In the archival documents of the Samarkand region of this period, materials on *waqf* property that directly belonged to sacred lineages were reflected, and the managers of this ownership form were called *mutawalli* or "the manager of *awlad*" (*zaveduiushchii avlyadom*).⁶⁷ On October 18, 1869, K. P. Kaufman ordered that *awlad-waqf* lands should be freed from taxation,⁶⁸ whereas profits from *waqf* lands not provided with reliable documentation should be directed to the state treasury.

In 1869–1870, A. K. Abramov, the governor of Zarafshan *okrug* (province), commissioned orientalist A. Kun to carry out a legal examination of the *waqf* documents of Samarkand province, and the latter noted chaos and confusion in these documents.⁶⁹ Analyzing various Sharia rules concerning *waqf* property, A. Kun concluded that many of them were controversial and ambiguous. The representatives of "sacred lineages," in 1873, provided some Russian officials (A. Grebenkin) with a power of attorney for running the case on the return of *waqf* lands. After Grebenkin's removal from Samarkand province, the power of attorney became void.⁷⁰

In 1873, M. Rostislavov, an orientalist and official at the Kattakurgan department, noted the complexity and controversial character of the *waqf* issue and suggested that a special commission be organized to deal with *waqf* cases.⁷¹ His position differed from K. Kaufman's strategy and was not taken into account.

The 1875 events in Kokand strengthened the authorities' anti-Islamic mood. The situation was complicated by A. Kun's actions, who had taken the *waqf* documents on the lands in the Samarkand area: he did not return all of the documents he had collected back to their owners. The fate of many of these documents is unknown (some of them are probably stored in his personal archive in St. Petersburg). It is hard to say whether such action was done purposefully or unintentionally. After the incident, the *waqf* owners became yet more suspicious and avoided showing all of their documents to the authorities, which was why some of the documentation was presented much later.

The governor-general of Turkestan who assumed the position after K. Kaufman's death, M. Cherniaev (1882–84), organized a commission to develop a project for the special spiritual management of regional Muslims. The commission consisted primarily of *sayyids*, *ishans*, and *khojas*, including *qazi* Mulla Nizam ad-Ddin Abdugaffarov, who represented Zarafshan *okrug*. However,

67 TsGA RUz. f. I-5, op. 1, d. 209, O naznachanii, peremeshenii i smene mutavali, l. 26–27.

68 Vasilii Viatkin, "O vakufakh Samarkandskoi oblasti," *Spravochnaia knizhka Samarkandskoi oblasti* 10 (1912), p. 99.

69 Aleksandr Kun, "Vakufy," *Turkestanskii vedomosti* 21 (1872).

70 *Turkestanskii vedomosti* 38 (1875).

71 M. Rostislavov, "Zametki po vakufnomu voprosu," *Turkestanskii vedomosti* 49 (1873).

the commission was disbanded soon after the removal of M. Cherniaev. After the uprising of Dukchi Ishan in the summer of 1898, this idea was raised again by the chief of Kattakurgan district, Chertov, who suggested finding the highest spiritual Muslim school in Tashkent for the training of people's judges, *muftis*, *imams*, and *mudarrises*. He suggested to organize the spiritual government of Muslims of the Turkestan region on a sample of the Transcaucasia.⁷² However, this initiative was not supported by superior authorities.

Meanwhile, the authorities' general policy toward *waqf* lands aimed at their sharp decrease, at least in Samarkand province. According to V. Viatkin, no new *waqf* was established in Samarkand province between 1868 and 1912.⁷³ Using the case of a *madrassa* case in Daghbit, S. Abashin noted that despite contradictions and inconsistency among the authorities in trying to solve the vacancy, the final decision was made for political reasons.⁷⁴

The local administrative system in the Turkestan Governor-Generalship varied according to the region and period of time. In 1887, in Syrdarya province, documents relating to the election of *mutawallis* were forwarded to rural officials for approval. In Samarkand province, only a *mutawalli* managing a large *waqf* could be appointed governor of the province, whereas the election of *mudarrises* and others was only reported to the administration.⁷⁵ In 1907, *mutawallis* were appointed based on a decree issued by the administration.⁷⁶

The human factor often played a key role in the policies implemented by the Russian in the region. The policy carried out by N. Rostovtsev, the military governor of Samarkand province, between 1891 and 1897, was relatively liberal.⁷⁷ His aspiration to promote the modernization of local society and education was highly estimated by the educator I. Gasprinskii.⁷⁸ N. Rostovtsev imposed relative order to the local education system. Cases of unauthorized appointment and the shift of *mudarris* not only by the rank of local administration but even mullahs, *mutawallis*, and any influential local rich man stopped.⁷⁹ His successor, Ia. D. Fedorov (1897–1899), followed this policy until the uprising of Dukchi Ishan. The following example demonstrates the liberal character of the

72 TsGA Ruz. f. I-22, op. 1, d. 657, l. 132ab.

73 Viatkin, "O vakufakh Samarkandskoi oblasti," pp. 98, 105.

74 Sergei Abashin, "Islam v biurokraticheskoi praktike tsarskoi administratsii Turkestana (vakufnoe delo dakhbitskogo medrese, 1892–1900)," in *Sbornik Russkogo istoricheskogo obshestva*, vol. 155, no. 7 (2003), p. 182.

75 TsGA Ruz. f. I-17, op. 1, d. 20477, l. 2, 3,3ab, 4,4ab.

76 TsGA Ruz. f. I-20, op. 1, d. 310, l. 8.

77 Azim Malikov, "Iz istorii politicheskoi elity Rossiiskoi imperii: deiatel'nost grafa N. Rostovtseva v Samarkande," in *Rossii i Uzbekistan: istoricheskii opyt modernizatsii v protsesse vzaimodeistviia i dialoga tsivilizatsii* (Tashkent, 2018), pp. 44–53.

78 Zainobiddin Abdirashidov, *Ismail Gasprinskii i Turkestan v nachale XX veka: sviazi, otnosheniia, vliianie* (Tashkent, 2011).

79 Azim Malikov, "Medrese Samarkanda v gosudarstvennoi politike Bukharskogo emirata i Rossiiskoi imperii (konets XVIII – nachalo XX v.)," *Istoriia i arkhologiiia Turana* 4 (2019).

Samarkand authorities. In December 1897, a well-known *ishan* named Khalifa Abdurazzak, who had come from Ferghana, died in Samarkand. He had stayed in Samarkand where he had brought up a large number of *murids* from the city proper and the neighboring territories, as well as those from among major Bukharan officials and representatives of the ruling dynasty in Bukhara. According to his contemporaries, his distinguished personal characteristics were straightforwardness, friendliness, absence of greediness, and knowledge of Sufism and other Islamic disciplines. The authorities allowed people to perform a funeral prayer at Registan, Samarkand's central square, in the Tilla-Kari mosque, where about 15,000 people gathered.⁸⁰ The subsequent governors of Samarkand region did not allow holding similar mass mourning actions in Registan square in Samarkand.

After the Andijan uprising of 1898, the fear of the threat of Muslim fanaticism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turkism amplified among the Russian authorities. Babadzhanov stated that after 1898, strict control was established over *waqf* property.⁸¹ P. Stolypin, prime minister of the Russian Empire (1906–1911), urged authorities to struggle against “Muslim danger,” Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, and the threat of the influence on Muslims of the Russian Empire from the side of the Ottoman Empire.⁸²

Ethnographer O. Sukhareva, who held a number of interviews with the descendants of Khoja Akhrar in Samarkand, wrote that being engaged in agriculture, these descendants also received *ushr* or *dakh-yak* (one-tenth of the land's produce) from *waqf* lands that were cultivated by peasants. However, in 1905, the authorities cancelled this privilege.⁸³

In general, as a result of the policy of the authorities (non-confirmation of *waqf* documents), there was a decrease in revenue and in the standard of living of many representatives of “sacred lineages,” although the well-known or long-ago legitimized families (e.g., Makhdumi Azam's descendants) had kept the respect and status they held among the population. The most powerful families of “sacred lineages” lost a significant proportion of their main source of income: *waqf*. Meanwhile, the governor N. Rostovtsev managed to establish confidential relations with the population of Samarkand. After the revolt of 1898, Islamophobia amplified among the Russian authorities. The control over Islamic institutes and influential figures from the circle of “sacred lineages” remained till March, 1917. Holy families of the Samarkand and Kattakurgan districts mostly did not take part in the revolt of 1916. However, in the Jizzakh

80 *Turkestanskije vedomosti* 1 (1898).

81 Babadzhanov, “Andizhanskoe vosstanie 1898 goda i ‘musul’ manskii vopros’ v Turkestane (vzgliady ‘kolonizatorov’ i ‘kolonizirovannykh’),” p. 110.

82 Arapov, *Sistema gosudarsvennogo regulirovaniia islama v Rossiiskoi imperii*, pp. 196–197.

83 Olga Sukhareva, *Potomki Khoja Akhrara: Dukhovenstvo i politicheskaia zhizn’ na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke v period feodalizma* (Moscow, 1985), pp. 157–168.

district of the Samarkand region there were some *ishans* who took the most active part in the organization of the resistance to the Russian power.

5. IMPACT OF RUSSIA'S POLICY ON THE SUFI BROTHERHOODS AND ISHANS

In the first half of the 19th century in the Emirate of Bukhara, Sufism was already organized in the form of religious orders. Members of sacred lineages often migrated from one region to another for economic reasons, as well as for performing religious activities. Some of these members, who were involved in Sufi practice, had thousands of disciples in different parts of Central Asia. Frequently, Uzbek- and Tajik-speaking *khojas* and *ishans* had disciples among Kazakhs in border territories. Notably, the religious activities of "sacred lineages" as well as the ordinary mullahs in border areas of the steppe were not always connected with Sufism. These activists carried out simple religious rituals and often pursued the aims of personal enrichment.

In the imperial discourse of the first half of the 19th century, the influence of Islamic law in the Kazakh steppe was considered as a temporary phenomenon that was widespread owing to the efforts of Muslim religious circles.⁸⁴ Probably, this discourse had been replicated among the Russian officials in the Kazakh steppe. The publications of Kazakh ethnographer, historian, and Russian officer Ch. Valikhanov (1835–1865) had a certain role in shaping the views of officials regarding the Islamic institutions in Central Asia. He regarded the Islam represented by Central Asian *khojas* as alien to Kazakh culture. In his article, "Islam in the steppe," he proposed to make a distinction between Kazakh and Central Asian *khojas*.⁸⁵ Valikhanov wrote it for the Russian authorities, and the Steppe commission quoted it.⁸⁶

The Russian authorities believed that the *ishans* impeded the civilizing mission of the Russian Empire in the region.⁸⁷ The bureaucracy was afraid of the possible consolidation of position of Islam among the Central Asian nomads, as the sedentary population, who adopted Islam long ago, was the model for the definite groups of nomads. In 1872, A. Khoroshkhin mentioned that

84 Paolo Sartori and Pavel Shablei, "Sud'ba imperskikh kodifikatsionnykh proektov: adat i shariat v Kazakhskoi stepi," *Ab Imperio* 2 (2015), pp. 72–73.

85 Chokan Valikhanov, "O musul'manstve v stepi," *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh. Tom 4* (Alma-Ata, 1985), pp. 74–75.

86 Tomohiko Uyama, "A Particularist Empire: The Russian Policies of Christianization and Military Conscription in Central Central Asia," in Tomohiko Uyama, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007), p. 27. In 1865, a special Steppe commission was created for the preparation of reforms on the territory of modern Kazakhstan. Representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the War Ministry, and local representatives entered the commission.

87 Alexander Knysh, "Sufism as an Explanatory Paradigm: The Issue of the Motivations of Sufi Resistance Movements in Western and Russian Scholarship," *Die Welt des Islams* 42:2, (2002), pp. 149–150.

the townsman was an ideal of the nomad in terms of civilization and comfort.⁸⁸ Therefore, using state resource, the bureaucracy strived for the sharp limitation of the influence of “sacred lineages” in the steppe.

The aim of Russian policy was to protect nomads from the influence of the so-called fanatical Islam produced in non-nomadic areas. Kaufman established distinct patterns of administration for each type of population (sedentary and nomad) to perpetuate the demarcation of the settled from the nomad.⁸⁹ According to archival data, Russian authorities in the 1870s limited the activity of Central Asian “sacred lineages” in the Kazakh steppe.⁹⁰

There are certain analogies in the interpretation of Sufism between French colonial Algeria and Russian Turkestan. In Algeria, a particular part of *ulama* wished the extermination of Sufi brotherhoods as it considered that Sufi orders do not correspond to orthodox Islam.⁹¹ The fact that there were contradictions between the *ulama* and Sufis is also important. In the Samarkand region, issues in the relationship of the *ulama* and Sufis have not been studied. Babadzhanov claimed that Russian experts communicated mostly with local intellectuals, but not with ordinary people.⁹² Accordingly, the intellectuals or *ulama* who were critically treating the Sufi orders influenced, to some extent, the preconceptions of Russian officials. For example, to understand Russian policy, its changes, and characteristic features in different periods of time, it is necessary to be aware of the officials’ concepts of *ishan*. According to a Samarkand official, *ishans* are not descendants of the Prophet Muhammad but are pseudo-*khoja*. The title *ishan* was achieved through religious deeds, not by birth. There was no solidarity within the *ishan* community; indeed, there was competition among them.⁹³ In 1894, Nil Lykoshin characterized *ishans* in the following way: “*Ishans* are followers and advocates of Sufism—a special religion based on the Islamic principles but in many respects deviating from Islamic dogmas, which adopted a number of Zoroastrian, Buddhist and pantheistic elements. *Ishans* are revered deeply and murids give presents to *ishans* as signs of relation and devotion.”⁹⁴

It is also necessary to consider that anti-Islamic concepts held by the Russian administration were from the influence of their experience in the war in the Caucasus where Sufism had been an ideology of resistance. The policy the Russian authorities pursued with respect to *ishans* was also contingent on in-

88 *Turkestanskije vedomosti* (October 10, 1873).

89 Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, p. 55.

90 TsGA RUz, f. I-36, op. 1, d. 1347, l. 1–19. Perepiska ob areste i rassledovanii dela zaderzhan-nikh v Kopale za propagandu Mian Salikha Mian Gumarova.

91 Omar Benaïssa, “Algerian Sufism in the Colonial Period,” in Reza Shah-Kazemi, ed., *Algeria: Revolution Revisited* (London: Islamic World Report, 1997), pp. 47–68.

92 Babadzhanov, “Andizhanskoe vosstanie 1898 goda i ‘musul’manskii vopros’ v Turkestane,” p. 130.

93 *Turkestanskije vedomosti* 14 (1877).

94 Nil Lykoshin, “Pis’ma iz Tuzemnogo Tashkenta,” *Turkestanskije vedomosti* 17, 28 (1894).

ternational political events. In 1912, the First Balkan War began. On November 2, 1912, the Ottoman clergy declared the holy war of Muslims. In that connection, the head of Samarkand *uezd* (district) sent a directive to local police officers to keep their eyes on *ishans*, compile their lists of *ishans*, allow them to travel only with special permissions from authorities, and stop their communication with locals.⁹⁵

The Kattakurgan *uezd* (district) of Samarkand province was a territory bordering on the Emirate of Bukhara, which was the rationale for the stricter control of the people's attitudes and Islamic organizations. After the 1892 cholera riot in Tashkent, the "strictness" further increased. In 1892, the authorities compiled detailed lists of *ishans* in Kattakurgan District. As noted in one of the archival documents, "*Ishans* have since recently been present in large numbers in Tashkent, which they use as a key area for their meetings." This observation was used as the reason for recording the number of *ishans* and controlling them so as not to allow new preachers to Samarkand province.⁹⁶ As it turned out, the *ishans* of Kattakurgan District used to visit their *murids* in the following regions: Tashkent, the banks of the Syrdarya where Kirgiz (Kazakh—A.M.) *murids* lived, and the Hissar area in the Emirate of Bukhara.⁹⁷ Thus, the report emphasized the broad communications of some *ishans* of Kattakurgan with the population of remote territories. Detailed data on Islamic institutes and sacred lineages were also collected in Jizzakh district, which bordered with the Kazakh steppe.

Dukchi *Ishan's* uprising in May 1898 resulted in the preparation of a series of documents in St. Petersburg and Tashkent aimed to "limit greatly the bad impact of the Muslim clergy."⁹⁸ Beginning in June 1898, all *ishans* in Kattakurgan District were required to furnish written confirmations, in which they promised to stop pursuing the profession of *ishan* and obtain special permission every time they leave the district. The confirmation started with the words, "I, an *ishan* living in the village of..."⁹⁹ Detailed lists of *mazars*, mosques, *khanaqas*, *madrasas*, *qalandars*, cemeteries, *ishans*, and *murids* of the region were compiled.¹⁰⁰

Officials noted that Bukhara had a great influence on the Muslims of Turkestan, with 138 persons from Kattakurgan alone studying in the *madrasas* of Bukhara in 1898.¹⁰¹ Russian authorities believed that the *madrasas* of Bukhara produced even more "fanatical" students than elsewhere in the empire.¹⁰² At

95 TsGA RUz, f. I-20, op. 1, e. 9, l. 12.

96 TsGA RUz, f. I-22, op. 1, d. 537, l. 1.

97 TsGA RUz, f. I-22, op. 1, d. 537, l. 12ab, 15, 15ab.

98 Elena Campbell, "The Autocracy and the Muslim Clergy in the Russian Empire (1850s–1917)," *Russian Studies in History* 44:2 (2005), pp. 16–17.

99 TsGA RUz, f. I-22, op. 1, d. 657, l. 9–35.

100 TsGA RUz, f. I-22, op. 1, d. 657, l. 91.

101 TsGA RUz, f. I-22, op. 1, d. 657.

102 Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar. Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia*, p. 258.

the same time, the authorities recognized their lack of knowledge of Islam and its institutes. In a circular dated August 8, 1898, the military governor noted that many employees in the administration of the Turkestan region “are insufficiently familiar with the most essential benchmarks of Islam and the organization of religious life of the Muslim population caused by it, determining the whole order of their internal life.”¹⁰³ By August 1898, already under the influence of the uprising of Dukchi Ishan, certain groups of Russian officials spread the discourse that *ishans* dream of the restoration of political independence and the transformation of Central Asia into *Dar-al-Islam*.¹⁰⁴

The collected data showed that the inhabitants of Samarkand province represented four Sufi orders, namely, Naqshbandiya, Qadiriya, Jahriya, and Ishqiya-Chustiia. The Jahriya order was considered the most popular. The heads of the orders Naqshbandiya and Jahriya lived in Bukhara, whereas those of Qadiriya and Ishqiya-Chustiia, in Samarkand. One of the *ishans* from Kattakurgan had 500 *murids* among the Kirgiz (Kazakhs—A.M.). Murids used to succeed their fathers, and so *ishans* were not able to gain new murids. A total of over 20 *khojas* were recorded in the Ming-arik area, and together they had more than 2,550 *murids*.¹⁰⁵ It is difficult to claim how far all this information corresponds to reality or whether the officials simply followed general instructions from Tashkent according to which they had to find these Sufi orders in Samarkand province.

Russian officials attempted to explain the reasons for the considerable influence of *ishans* in the region. The chief police officer in Penjikent in 1911 reported the following: “Common people know the religion only superficially, which is why *ishans* are so influential. *Ishans* are the pillars of Islamism, they do their best to prevent European culture and Russian knowledge from penetrating the local community. They wish to take as many *murids* as possible. *Ishans* cure people by giving them small pieces of paper containing dicta from the Quran. Apart from curing, *ishans* educate their followers in such affairs as religion and rituals and make efforts to take as much grain and money from them as possible.”¹⁰⁶ According to B. Karmysheva, following one or another *ishan* or *pir* was perceived by descendants of the semi-nomadic population as a main condition for affiliation to Islam.¹⁰⁷

The *waqf* policy and confinement of *ishans'* Sufi practice led to the lowering of profits among sacred lineages, which was also recorded in official documents. For instance, analysis of the *ishans* of Kattakurgan revealed that they

103 TsGA RUz, f. I-22, op. 1, d. 657, Po voprosu ustroistva dukhovnogo byta musul'man v krae, l. 46.

104 Evgenii Smirnov, “Dervishizm v Turkestane,” *Turkestanskije vedomosti* 58 (1898).

105 TsGA RUz, f. I-22, op. 1, d. 657, l. 8, 9, 31, 35ab, 36ab.

106 TsGA RUz, f. I-20, op. 1, d. 9, l. 8–8ab.

107 Balkis Karmysheva, “O musul'manskom dukhovenstve v sel'skikh raionakh Bukharskogo khanstva v kontse XIX – nachale XX v.,” in *Bartol'dovskie chteniia*, 1982: *God shestoi, tezisy dokladov i soobshenii* (Moscow, 1982), pp. 25–26.

lived modestly, mostly on what people gave them. According to Lykoshin, as the Russian Empire established its authority over the region, complex social processes began, which led to the change in people's attitude, with more criticism and condemnation toward hypocritical *ishans*.¹⁰⁸

Qalandars were wandering ascetic Sufi dervishes who related to a particular Sufi order in Central Asia. Adherents considered themselves as disciples of B. Naqshband. The main center of the order, headed by the *Shaykh*, was located in Samarkand. Its branches had been scattered across Central Asia and Afghanistan.¹⁰⁹ *Qalandars* lived in the special district of Samarkand, which has kept the name *Qalandar-khona*. In the period of imperial rule, to undermine the economic basis of the order, local colonial authorities prohibited *qalandars* from collecting alms. As a result, in 1884, the number of *qalandars* in Samarkand reduced by 60 people from the former 268 in previous years. The appeal of heads of the order to authorities on the permission for collecting alms was not fruitful.¹¹⁰ Strict control over sacred families, especially *ishans*, from the authorities amplified after the May events of 1898. As a result of this policy, there were only 22 dervishes left in Samarkand by 1917.¹¹¹

The policy of the authorities led to the destruction of Sufi groups and their broad communication among the population. Communications of the tutor (*pir*) and the pupil (*murid*) had been destroyed or weakened, which promoted the decline of the prestige of *ishans*.

6. ISLAMIC REFORMISM AND ITS IMPACT ON "SACRED LINEAGES"

An important factor, which influenced Russian politics and the transformation of society to a certain extent, was the transition to modernity. Researchers give different interpretations to this term. N. Smelser described modernization as a multidimensional change across a number of areas. In the sphere of education, modernization means the elimination of illiteracy, as well as the increase in the value of knowledge and skilled labor.¹¹²

At present, the problem of Islamic modernists at the beginning of the 20th century continues to be discussed. Some argue that Jadidism reflected a number of intellectual and cultural practices that are closely related to the discourse of Islamic "reform."¹¹³ The ideas of the Muslim enlightener Ismail

108 Nil Lykoshin, *Polzhizni v Turkestane: Ocherki byta tuzemnogo naseleniia* (Petrograd, 1916), p. 13.

109 V. Iarovyi-Ravskii, ed., *Sbornik materialov po musul'manstvu, sostavlenn po rasporyazheniiu i ukazaniiam S. M. Dukhovskogo* (St. Petersburg, 1899), pp. 29–30.

110 TsGA RUz, f. I-5, op. 1, d. 1499, l. 11.

111 TsGA RUz, f. I-18, op. 1, d. 3977, l. 5ab, 6.

112 Neil Smelser, "Processes of Social Change," in Neil Smelser, ed., *Sociology: An Introduction* (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 747–748.

113 Jeff Eden, Paolo Sartori, and Devin DeWeese, "Moving Beyond Modernism: Rethinking Cultural Change in Muslim Eurasia (19th–20th Centuries)," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 59:1–2 (2016), pp. 1–36.

Gasprinskii (1851–1914), who was the editor of the *Tarzhuman* newspaper, had a great influence on Muslim intellectuals of the Russian Empire. According to Gasprinskii, each trained Muslim could be a *khoja* (teacher), *muezzin*, *imam*, and *akhun*, if the community agreed. Islam did not have nor recognize hierarchy, and therefore, it did not have a clerical caste.¹¹⁴ Thus, I. Gasprinskii completely repudiated the status of “sacred lineages.” The ideas of Gasprinskii had a strong impact on Samarkand Jadids. Changes in the outlook and perspectives of a certain part of the *ulama* are described in the publications of the Samarkand intellectual M. Bihbudi (1875–1919).¹¹⁵

In particular, in the transformation of the status of “sacred lineages,” one can see not only the external influence of Russian colonialism but also the internal logic of transforming the Muslim world. For example, M. Bihbudi questioned the legitimacy of donations (*nazr*) to *ishans*. He stressed the need to eliminate the illegal innovations introduced by local saints.¹¹⁶

Some representatives of the “sacred lineages” may have been encouraged to take part in the reformatory movement by the destruction of the traditional *waqf* system, break in links within the *ishan* class, restriction of Sufi orders’ activity, and deprivation of all privileges, alongside other numerous factors. In the early 20th century, the *ulama* was divided into groups, which had different views on the future of Islam, the region, and their development. Russian authorities feared the activities of Muslim reformists, viewed as an instrument of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism.¹¹⁷

M. Bihbudi presented a project of autonomy to the Muslim faction of the Second and Third State Duma in 1907. Turkestan autonomy had to be controlled by the five-year term election of a *Shaykh al-Islam* who was obliged to possess profound knowledge of Sharia. The status of Jews and foreigners, donations of *waqf*, school education, and other elements were mentioned in the project.¹¹⁸

New changes took place in 1917. In June 1917, the executive committee of the organization “Muravij ul Islam” (the society for the development of Islam) was founded in Samarkand. The committee consisted of 38 members, chaired by I. Shirinkhodzhaev (representative of a sacred lineage), a judge and a teacher from the Sher-Dor *madrassa*. The society members put forward their reformation project. They suggested that all *qazis*, school and *madrassa* teachers, *muftis*,

114 Ismail Gasprinskii, *Russkoe musul'manstvo: mysli, zametki i nabliudenii musul'manina* (Simferopol, 1881).

115 *Turkestanskije vedomosti* (April 13, 1917).

116 Eden, Sartori, and DeWeese, “Moving Beyond Modernism,” p. 23.

117 Daniel Brower, *Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire* (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 71.

118 Hisao Komatsu, “Dar al-Islam under Russian Rule as Understood by Turkestani Muslim Intellectuals,” in Tomohiko Uyama, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia*, pp. 19–20.

and *imams* should be selected based on preliminary tests and be provided with special certificates. All decisions should be made based on Sharia. The committee wanted to obtain rights to settle *waqf*-related issues, supervise the collection and distribution of *zakat*, and other aspects of Islamic life.¹¹⁹

Despite the official policy, a 1917 review of a local Russian official in Samarkand showed that *mudarrises*, *qazis*, *muftis*, and *ishans* were the most respected among common people. Meanwhile, representatives of the local Russian authorities noted that the local Muslim intelligentsia, nobility, *ishans*, and the clergy dreamed of their former influence on people. He also noted that up until 1889, large areas of lands had been given to mosques, and by 1917, this practice almost ceased.¹²⁰

Overall, as a result of the policy of the authorities and the process of modernization in the Samarkand region, a substantial social transformation of "sacred lineages" occurred. In the projects of reforms that were put forward by Islamic reformists between 1906 and 1917, there was no mention of Sufi orders, and attempts to give them a legal status in the country could not be found as well.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of documents associated with the history of "sacred lineages" in Samarkand province showed that at the time of the Turkestan Governor-Generalship, they underwent social transformation, which was significantly influenced by the official state policy aimed at weakening the power of the most popular sacred lineages and Sufi orders. To understand the position of the religious elite, it is also important to consider that the "sacred lineages" had monopolized knowledge of Muslim laws and the resolution of legal and religious issues. A considerable role in changes was played by the internal processes in Muslim society, criticism from the *ulama* of Sufi ideology, and the Sufi brotherhoods.

In the first years after the occupation of the territory, the Russian authorities used to maneuver in their relations with the Muslim clergy, but after they had conquered the Khanates of Khiva and Kokand, they took a stricter position. The most influential families from the "sacred lineages" were deprived of *waqf*, their principal source of income. At the same time, the human factor also played an important part. Thus, according to the research, Governor N. Rostovtsev managed to establish confidential relations with the people of Samarkand.

119 *Samarkand* (June 14, 1917). Azim Malikov, "Samarkandskie reformatory nachala XX veka: Isahodzha Shirinkhodzhaev," in *XXX mezhdunarodnyi kongress po istochnikovedeniiu i istoriografii stran Azii i Afriki: K 150-letiiu akademika V. V. Bartol'da (1869–1930). Materialy kongressa, tom 1* (St. Petersburg, 2019), pp. 473–475.

120 TsGA RUz, f. I-18, op. 1, d. 3977, l. 5, 5ab.

The study of documents of the Russian administration of Samarkand illustrated that the most careful control and recording of the religious activities of the population and sacred lineages took place along the borders between the Emirate of Bukhara and the Kazakh steppe in the Kattakurgan district. This control necessitated the collection of more detailed data on the *ishans*, *mazars*, and mosques.

Some representatives of "sacred lineages" also enjoyed privileges for their support of the Russian authorities in every possible way. Overall, the policy of the Russian authorities (refusal to approve *waqf* documents, prohibition of *ishans'* practice) resulted in the fall of incomes and the level of living standards in many "sacred families," although the most famous or long-legitimized families (such as the descendants of Makhdumi Azam) retained their status and esteem among the local people. The Russian authorities' policy led to the disintegration of Sufi groups and break of their broad relations with the population. The strict control of sacred families, particularly *ishans*, by the authorities intensified after the events of May 1898, Dukchi Ishan's uprising.

The policy pursued by the authorities and the modernization process in Samarkand province led to a considerable transformation of the "sacred lineages." Notably, reformists of Turkestan, including the leader of the Samarkand reformists, M. Bihbudi, were under strong influence of the views of I. Gasprinskii, who denied the existence of "sacred lineages." Thus, the new forming ideology also led to the transformation of understanding of the status and role of the "sacred lineages" in Central Asian society. Pre-Russian attitudes with respect to sacred lineages gradually changed, and new concepts of Turkestanian, Turk, were formed. Although Islamic reformists (many of whom originated from sacred lineages) demanded the establishment of religious institutes in Turkestan, they did not suggest a return to the pre-Russian forms of government. They supported the coexistence of the Muslim and non-Muslim population and recognized the usefulness of appointment as *Shaykh al-Islam*, judges, and other positions by election, rather than on the basis of descent.