# Summary

## Co-existence from the Base of Society of Sakhalin Koreans
## In Karafuto, Sakhalin and South Korea

NAKAYAMA Taisho

East Asia has many borderlands where the national borders have shifted. Sakhalin Island is one such borderland. The border between Japan and Russia/USSR has changed several times on Sakhalin Island and the nearby Soya Straits. Not only the majority populations (i.e., Japanese and Russian), but also other ethnic groups have migrated to the island after each change in the border. Moreover, every border shift meant a change in regime.

These migrations have formed over 99% of the island's population. What kind of inter-ethnic relations did the migrants build under each regime? How did the migrants form their definition of self in conditions of co-existence from the base of the island's social hierarchy?

About 3,500 elderly Koreans have returned from Sakhalin to South Korea since Perestroika began in 1986. These Hanin had migrated to, or were born in Karafuto, the southern part of the island under the Japanese Empire. Hanin have been well known as some of the victims—as "mobilized Koreans"—under the Japanese Empire. However, we can find another group that is different from these mobilized Koreans among Hanin.

In 1910, the Japanese Empire formally annexed Korea. Labour and merchandise markets in the Japanese Empire were opened to Koreans. Koreans also began to migrate to Karafuto directly or via the Japanese mainland and other areas. The population of migrating Hanin had reached about 8,000 in 1938 just before the start of the wartime mobilization of Koreans. It is said that many Hanin migrants were manual labourers. However, not all of Hanin migrants were employees; some were employers or got other higher socio-economic positions.

In contrast to Zainichi Koreans (ethnic Koreans in Japan), Hanin can be distinguished by their education under Japanese colonialism, their complaints against the USSR government that followed the Japanese, their cultural differences from Koreans on the mainland and their pro-Japanese feelings.

This paper aims to analyze how these pro-Japanese Hanin formed their definition of self in

conditions of co-existence from the base of society under each regime (the Japanese Empire, the USSR/Russia) from their narratives by focusing not on what occurred inside their ethnic community but on their inter-ethnic relationships with those outside that community. The narratives of these Hanin will be discussed based on life-history interviews with ten Hanin living in Gohyang Maeul, South Korea. In addition, the existence of Hanin who returned or wished to return from Sakhalin to Japan will be discussed based on official documents of the Japanese government and private documents of a civic group.

The interviewees thought that they could be appreciated in the same way as the majority around them under both the Japanese Empire and the USSR if they had enough ability and made enough effort. It was because they had room to live as part of a multi-nation state and a migrant society as an ethnic minority and migrants. They have set personal effort and relationships with the majority above ethnic solidarity. In turn, they have had few exchanges with South Koreans after returning to their "home country" because of their age, their cultural background and their socio-economic situation.

The interviewees didn't feel that there was so much difference between them and the Japanese under the Japanese Empire. They acquired Soviet citizenship under the USSR and South Korean nationality on returning to South Korea in a strategic fashion.

They felt different from the Japanese, Russians and South Koreans. Their memory and education under the Japanese Empire and their lives under the USSR for over half a century make it hard for them to integrate themselves into their home country, South Korea. To be precise, they do not have any motivation to integrate because they have been supplied with funds to cover their living expenses and medical bills, and maintain not all but a large part of the social capital and relationships that they have built up in Sakhalin.

# Cyberspace and State Sovereignty

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The concept of cyberspace is only a metaphor, as well as telegraphy. On the one hand, those who believe in the absence of territorial borders in cyberspace can insist that state sovereignty has nothing to do with cyberspace. On the other hand, the argument that cyberspace should be defined as a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data has gained in power recently. Because of the fact that infrastructures are located in some territories, the state can lay claim to jurisdiction over cyberspace.

In order to investigate the appropriateness of the insistence of the state, we explore how the state gains jurisdiction over land, sea, air, and space historically. Although modernization enabled the state sovereignty to govern some territories through international laws, this does not mean that such control of the state is universal. Never forget that the state is only a *deus mortalis*, that is, a "mortal God," as Thomas Hobbs wrote in *Leviathan*.

In the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America published in 2005, it is stated that the ability to operate in and from the global commons—space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace—is important. Nonetheless, the US government changed its position that the global commons include cyberspace after Barack Obama was elected president of the United States. The US government had begun to insist that each state could insist on jurisdiction over cyberspace, because cyberspace consisted of information infrastructures and data. It encouraged experts to make so called *Tallinn Manual*. Tallinn Manual applicable to cyber warfare will become the basis of the international law on "cyber war."

Nevertheless, we cannot authorize this "realistic approach." This approach is only an opinion of the United States, losing hegemony in the world. Although the hegemon tries to have an influence on experts through the cyber-industrial complex, we can criticize the modus operandi of the United States. We can propose an "idealistic approach" based upon the absence of territorial borders in cyberspace.

# Crossing the Boundary

## A New Trend of Religious Zionism in the West Bank

IMANO Taizo

In recent years, various sectors and groups have started to challenge the traditional Zionist ideology and have attempted to alter the sociopolitical structure of the Israeli regime from within and without. While non-Zionists and post-Zionists are gaining more voices within this regime, neo-Zionists also emerged as a strong social force trying to redefine Israel, Zionism and Judaism and impose their definition on others.

This essay suggests the validity of the approach combining sociopolitical concepts of "moral community" and "moral boundary" and the geographical-spatial analysis of their dynamics to apprehend this situation. This paper applies this approach to the case of religious Zionism and its settlements built in the occupied West Bank, with special focus on the emergence of a new type of settlement called the "mixed community."

This paper shows that the "mixed community" is a combined result of the isolation and dilemmas facing the national-religious sector in Israel and the economic and social difficulties facing secular settlements in the West Bank, especially in the Jordan Valley. This paper then analyzes, based on fieldwork in one of the "mixed communities," how the moral communities and boundaries of the national-religious settlers and secular settlers interact with each other and how the process of cross-bordering among the settlers relate with the boundary between the settlers and the Palestinians under the occupation.

It is argued that despite the shared norms among the residents in the "mixed community" regarding the strategic and political importance of the settlement in the Jordan Valley and their common perception to the Palestinians, the previous borders between the national-religious and secular settlers are not only maintained but also strengthened and spatialized due to various social conflicts within the settlement. It will also show that the process of cross-bordering by the settlers does not affect the legal and physical colonial boundary between the "Jewish nation" and the Palestinians, but rather this boundary functions as the "moral boundary" that justifies and sustains the discrimination and exploitation against the Palestinians and serves to maintain the system of colonization in the West Bank.

# Community Based Tourism as a Potential Tool for Reducing the Impact of Borders in the Occupied Territories

## Tourism Activity Initiatives by Local Communities in Palestine

TAKAMATSU Kuniko

This article examines tourism activities undertaken by residents of host communities, so-called Community Based Tourism (or CBT hereafter), as a tool for reducing the impact of the restrictive physical borders and barriers installed in the Occupied Palestinian Territories on the West Bank. The first part of the article analyzes barrier construction and its impact on local communities. The second part describes five examples of CBT in West Bank communities focusing on the innovative ways in which they have protected their communities from the impact of physical barriers encroaching on their communities.

In the twentieth century, the world has witnessed several drastic political regime changes in Palestine. The birth of Israel developed new border issues in the region. After the occupation of the Palestinian territories began, borders continued to extend into the Palestinian land. An originally transitional agreement of A, B, and C zoning became perpetual and left Palestine as a fragmented "archipelago" with nearly 60% of the land that contains major water and natural resources under the full control of Israel. More than 700 km of segregation walls, nearly 1,000 permanent and temporary checkpoints, and over 200 settlements containing an estimated 530,000 settlers have been constructed throughout the West Bank. Severe impacts due to such territorial fragmentation and the encroachment of barriers on Palestinian life have been reported. These impacts include the obstruction of movement, impediments to economic growth, increased difficulty in accessing medical and educational services, and restricted access to and deteriorated management of private agricultural land, as well as of water and of other natural resources.

The Palestinian tourism industry has shown a painstaking recovery from its nearly total collapse due to the Second Intifada, and it is now attracting around 2.25 million tourists a year. Eighty to ninety percent of Palestinian tourism is religious in nature (e.g., pilgrimage and non-pilgrimage tourists visiting archaeological and historical sites with religious affiliations). The industry has been monopolized predominantly by the mass tourism industry operated by Israeli tour operators. All entries of tourists to Palestine are under the full control of Israeli authorities, and the restricted

movements of Palestinian ID holders make the Palestinian tourism business very difficult to grow.

Residents of several communities on the West Bank attempt to promote several different kinds of CBT to accomplish different goals: 1) to share stories and perspectives on the real life experiences of contemporary Palestinians by providing direct cultural experiences and positive interactions with local communities (e.g., experiential tourism, solidarity tourism and alternative tourism); 2) to alleviate the unequal relationship between the guests and hosts and increase economic opportunities for the host communities (e.g., fair trade tourism); 3) to sustain and protect the environment through education (e.g., ecotourism and rural tourism); 4) to change the traditionally negative and grossly biased images of Palestinians as being "terrorists" and "uncultured," therefore, sufficiently "justifying" and "reinforcing" the occupation mentality (e.g., responsible tourism and justice tourism).

This article examines five cases of CBT. 1) The Alternative Tourism Group (ATG), the first and oldest locally driven tourism organization, specializing in pilgrimage and justice tourism. ATG seeks to promote a positive image of Palestine and to contribute towards establishing peace in the region. 2) The Battir Landscape Eco Museum was established as a way to protect Battir's ancient Roman irrigation system and terrace from the construction of segregation walls. The village of Battir submitted an application for world heritage inscription of their terrace last year. By walking on the trails of the Eco Museum, tourists can learn about the history, rich nature and archeology of Battir. 3) The Rozana Association focuses on rural development in the town of Birzeit and the surrounding areas through community based tours and cultural events and through networking and sharing skills with fellow organizations. The annual Birzeit Heritage Week is a major cultural event attracting more than 30,000 visitors. This sets an example for the development of other rural towns in Palestine. 4) Abraham's Path, originally suggested by the Harvard Negotiation Team, is a long-distance walking trail across the Middle East which connects the sites visited by Abraham, the father of the three major monotheistic religions, as recorded in ancient religious texts and traditions. The Palestinian portion of the trail has been nominated as the No.1 New Walking Trail in the World by the magazine *National Geographic*. Tours help generate income for the communities along the trails and promote better and more realistic understanding of the region while encouraging tourists to appreciate the heritage and hospitable nature of the places Abraham visited. 5) The Network for Experiential Palestinian Tourism Organizations (NEPTO) is a network of 19 NGOs offering 51 community based tourism programs that offer tourists a chance to explore Palestinian culture, the people and their aspirations through the coordination of common efforts on humanistic, cultural, heritage, historic, solidarity, and environmental programs.

The five cases above demonstrate the innovative ways the local communities in Palestine

use tourism as a tool to protect their communities from both the impact of occupation and the encroachment of physical barriers.

# Christianity in Palau

KONYA Akari

This paper aims to discuss the ambiguity between indigenous shamanism and Christianity in contemporary Palau through an examination of how people cross borders between two different religious spheres. It first describes the anthropological discourse on Christianity in Oceania since the nineteenth century to classify the differences in the way Christianity was received in Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia. It then focuses on the case study of Micronesia, especially in Palau through an analysis of peoples' ordinary practices such as traditional chants, herbal treatment, and peculiar currency exchange which deeply concerns their indigenous shamanism to consider how they construct relations between several spheres in present time.

Palau started as a modern nation after gaining independence in 1994. Before independence, Palau had experienced over 100 years of colonial rule by four different countries, i.e. Spain (1891-1899), German (1899-1914), Japan (1914-1945) and the United States (1945-1994). Missionaries started to propagate Catholicism in Palau during the Spanish period, though it was under German administration that local people started to convert to Christianity. Based on the *International Religious Freedom Report 2007* published by the US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, approximately 65 percent of the Palau's 20,000 population is Roman Catholic. Aside from Catholicism, there is also *Modekngei*, a new religion of Palau which was established under the early Japanese mandate, and includes indigenous shamanism and Catholicism. There has also been a recent upsurge among the SDA (Seventh-day Adventist) members in Palau as a Protestant Christian group.

Earlier studies on the history of the receptivity process of Christianity in Oceania tend to focus on how missionary works impacted the local politics and economy. Although such discussion facilitates significant understanding on the political culture of the local people, it treats the religious role—which is an important aspect for analysis of the polyphyletic world view in Oceania—as a secondary problem until the "Cargo cult" emerged in Melanesia in the 1970s. As one of the representative

things of the social movement broke out in Oceania, the Cargo cult was also seen in Melanesia. At first, researchers dealt with it as one of the Millenarianism. They understood it as an appearance of a new religion or a cult of the indigenous faith and by doing so, treated it as a "strange" and "irrational" faith. However, under the post-structural perspective and postcolonial criticisms, it has gradually been reinterpreted as a "social tangle" as indigenous campaign.

On the other hand in Micronesia, the reception of Christianity was carried out after the nineteenth century when it fell most from other areas. In spite of the strategy of such the rule country influences, there was no outbreak of the conspicuous social/religious movement when compared with other regions. However, it has been pointed out that religious tangles existed ceaselessly in their traditional political systems and customs. In a recent study analyzing how Micronesia people became Christian, two types of differences were noted: (1) refusal of traditional gods to accept a Christian god, (2) harmonization of the traditional religion with Christianity.

On the basis of the above mention background, this paper shows the conflict between Palauan indigenous shamanism and Christianity through a case study of the role on religion in contemporary Palau.

# Differences in Maintaining Symbiotic Relationships
## The Hui's Religious Practices in Xi'an, China

IMANAKA Takafumi

This paper, focusing on the Hui in Xi'an City, Shaanxi Province, China, describes the historically formed groups in the region and the Hui's religious practices. It also analyzes how the Hui maintain symbiotic relationships with the Han living around their communities.

The Hui are a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority group in China. They live in all parts of China, speak Mandarin Chinese, and their physical appearance closely resembles that of the ethnic majority group, the Han Chinese. However, the Hui's practice of Islam has created some striking cultural differences between them and the Han Chinese. The Hui were known to live in close proximity to mosques (*Qingzhensi* in Mandarin), which formed the heart of their communities, and maintained symbiotic relationships with the Han Chinese living around their communities. Recent investigations have demonstrated that Hui communities have undergone significant changes:

some of them have been reorganized while others have disappeared. However, the Xi'an Hui have preserved their traditions and customs in such circumstances. Thus, this study investigates the Xi'an Hui ethnic group through describing the historically formed sub-groups and their religious practices and analyzes how they maintain their communities.

Xi'an, one of the oldest cities in China, has 60,000 Hui and 31 mosques or other places of worship. The Hui live close to their mosques, which constitute the center of their communities. Those living close to the Hui posit that the different Xi'an Hui communities are independent of each other. In fact, there exist two forms of multi-tiered relationships between some communities. On the one hand, there are large Hui residential districts in the central area of Xi'an City, known locally as the "Hui quarter" (*Huifang*), which include 12 communities. Moreover, there are three religious factions (*Jiaopai*) that differ in their interpretations of Islamic dogma. The origin of the "Hui quarter" goes back to the middle Ming dynasty, and the area's boundary was clearly defined in the late Qing dynasty. Then, through the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China, the Hui continuously built new communities in Xi'an, expanding their society. On the other hand, in the early Republic of China, Ikhwan (Chinese *Yihewani*) was introduced to the Hui from the outside. It has polarized Xi'an Hui society, and the groups have been in conflictual relationships until now.

In this article, through summarizing the historical backgrounds of the two forms of multi-tiered relationships, I indicate that the Xi'an Hui are influenced by community relationships, which results in certain changes, for example, urban renewal or avoidance of marriage between different religious factions. In addition, I reveal that the division between two different religious factions, the Gedimu and Ikhwan, was caused by *Nietie*, an important religious practice for the Xi'an Hui. The term *Nietie* refers to "voluntary alms"—to cover the expenditures of running a mosque, publishing religious books, and so on. The Xi'an Ikhwan criticize the Gedimu for their practice of *Nietie*, as the Gedimu provide compensation for the reading of the Qur'an, a religious practice known as *Guo Nietie*, which the Ikhwan argue is not in accord with Islamic teachings. The Gedimu countered that it is necessary for maintaining religious faith in China, a non-Islamic nation.

A local Hui scholar argues that *Guo Nietie* is a patterned religious practice that is engaged in after one's wishes are realized. The Xi'an Gedimu practice two kinds of *Guo Nietie*: public and private. Generally speaking, public *Nietie* is performed in the mosques, whereas private *Nietie* is performed in private residences. The former is performed in connection with other mosques and serves as an important religious practice to maintain traditions and customs, while the latter is performed after funeral rites and memorial services and helps the Hui maintain their connection to a certain mosque and recognize the relationship between the mosque and themselves as well as their place in the community.

# Framework to Analyze Borders from a Gender Perspective
## Case Studies of Borders at the Lower Mekong Basin Countries

Kᴜsᴀᴋᴀʙᴇ Kyoko

This paper discusses what perspectives from borders can offer to gender and development studies through examining cases of borderlands at the Lower Mekong Basin countries in Southeast Asia. Borderlands are particular places where social norms and practices can be lenient and where state control can be different from centerlands. It is a place where the state implements particular control for national security reason, but at the same time, a place where people living at the border can utilize counter-hegemonic forces (Staudt 1998) against the state to protect and enhance their livelihoods. The paper utilized three key dimensions of borderlands (modified from the four dimensions identified by Segura and Zavella (2008)), namely, structural, discursive, and interactional/relational dimensions to analyze the three borderlands at the Lower Mekong Basin.

The structural dimension was discussed using the case of Thai-Cambodian border and Thai-Lao border. Thai-Cambodian case analyzed the cross-border fish trade from Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia to Thailand. When the borderland was a battlefield, small-scale fish trade by women flourished. However, when peace came and the state started to control the border by "opening" border trade, female small-scale fish traders were not able to compete with larger traders and were marginalized.

At the Lao-Thai border, Lao weavers started to receive sub-contracting work from Thai weavers when Thai weavers were not able to produce enough to meet demand. Such cash income improved the standing of Lao weavers in their households. However, when more and more Lao women started to weave, the market was flooded with hand-woven material. As the price dropped, so had the quality of the material. Poor weavers started to sell to traders instead of going to the market themselves, isolating themselves from exposure to the market and market information.

The discursive dimension was explored through the case study of Thai-Cambodian border and Thai-Burmese border. In the fish trade case at the Thai-Cambodian border, although female Cambodian small-scale traders are at a disadvantage, these fish traders used the linkages with Thai traders for business survival. They also used their discursive power to belittle the importance of the border in order to counter the state control that had marginalized them.

At the Myanmar-Thai border town of Mae Sot, Thailand, migrant workers from Myanmar worked

under bad conditions with low pay. However, the lenient control over migrant workers at the border area enabled migrants to invite their families from Myanmar to live with them in Mae Sot. This allowed for wider variety of employment patterns among workers, as well as wider options for childcare compared to the centerlands. By creating a discourse that Mae Sot is an "extension" of Myanmar, women were able to get better support from their families back home.

The interactional/relational dimensions are discussed through the cases of Thai-Cambodian border and Thai-Lao border. The case of female fish border traders at Thai-Cambodian border showed that the only way the Cambodian traders were able to survive the harsh competition in trade was through strengthening their linkages with Thai traders, even though the power relations with them were unequal.

The Lao weavers at the Thai-Lao border also had an unequal relationship with Thai weavers. With more and more Lao weavers joining the market, prices dropped and Lao weavers lost their direct access to the border market. Lao weavers had a weaker negotiation position vis-a-vis the Thai weavers, and the state started to exercise more control over the weavers at the border by imposing an export tax. However, some Lao weavers were able to circumvent such power relations with Thai traders and the state with the help of their husbands. They were able to access wider array of markets in Bangkok by relying on their husbands for transportation.

Studying borderlands and border people's relationship with the state and market shows how productive activities and social/gender relations are shaped by the structural changes in state governance as well as market changes. This paper attempted to demonstrate how women at the borderlands perceived "border," and how they have tried to overcome restrictions imposed on them through the border, and at the same time, how they tried to utilize the border for their own benefit. Women at the borderlands not only confront state control, but also challenge social norms by mobilizing discourse and economic power for their survival and freedom.