

INTRODUCTION

EMPIRE STUDIES IN JAPAN

In this collection, five Japanese historians try to present new perspectives in studying four historical empires — the French, Japanese, Russian, and Qing Empires. Our purpose is to overcome, to some extent, insufficient exposure of Japanese historiography in the booming study of empires. As is the case with historiographies in other countries, it is not easy to identify the origins of the present boom in empire studies in Japan. Some specialists would trace it back to the 1980s, when the Leninist concept of imperialism had lost its intellectual appeal, whereas new methodologies, such as the world system theory, postcolonialism, Orientalism, and constructivist analyses of narratives — all of which would later provide the foundation of empire studies — began to be applied. Other scholars would start the story of modern imperiology from the 1990s, when the end of the Cold War resulted in ephemeral unilateral hegemony of the United States and when the collapse of the Soviet empire did *not* result in democracy and respect for human rights in many of its successor nation-states. Some Japanese historians would argue that academic studies of the Japanese Empire became possible when historians became emancipated from accusatory or demonizing historiography, whilst postmodernist historians of the British Empire would complain that the mainstream of British historiography, represented by the five volumes of *The Oxford History of the British Empire* (1998-1999), does not reflect this empire's colonial past, and this is a serious predicament for methodological innovation of empire studies. Specialists of the Russian

Empire might possibly see the origins of current empire studies in the national historiographies promoted in the Soviet era, which Andreas Kappeler synthesized in his monumental book.¹ I owe respect to all these positions. Yet if we qualify modern imperiology as a genre of historical science, in which historians appreciate empires for their own values, neither as some attribute to a certain stage of capitalist development nor as a background to national or gender consciousness, we may find the origins of modern imperiology in Japan only in the recent past.

The continuous workshops held at Kyoto University from April 1998 to March 2001 by a group of historians (hereafter, I will refer to them as the “Kansai school”² for simplicity) can perhaps be regarded as the point of departure from the traditional, “contextual” understanding of empire.³ Three research trends bound with historical empires flew into this workshop: specialists in global history, Central Eurasian (inner Asian) empires, and composite monarchies of early modern Europe. In 2003, these historians published the results of this workshop as a collection entitled *A Study of Empire: Principles, Typology, and Relations*.⁴ This collection proposed a functional definition of empire: “the higher, integrating authorities standing above multiple communes, tribes, societies, regions, powers, governments, and states” and “the relations, spheres of influence, and order” built around these authorities (p. 62).

In the same year, Norihisa Yamashita, then-associate professor of Hokkaido University, who had undergone academic apprenticeship under the supervision of Immanuel Wallerstein at New York State University, published a book entitled *Reading Japan through the Prism of the World System Theory*.⁵ Highlighting early modern empires of the world, Yamashita criticizes Wallerstein’s understanding of the “long

¹ Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History* (Harlow, England: Longman, 2001).

² Kansai is the western region/megalopolis of Japan, to which Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe Cities belong.

³ Alexander Semenov calls the position from which to view empire as an environment in which nationalities grow and operate a school of “empire as context.”

⁴ Yamamoto Yuzo, ed., *Teikoku no kenkyu: genri, ruikai, kankei* (Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 2003).

⁵ Yamashita Norihisa, *Sekai shisutemu ron de yomu Nihon* (Tokyo: Kodan Publishers, 2003).

sixteenth century” as the start of incorporation of non-European regions of the world into the Europe-centered world system. There were at least five regional systems in the sixteenth-century world and Europe was only one of them, still inferior to most of the other four by productive capacity. The others were North Eurasia (being quickly incorporated into the Russian Empire), Western Asia (the Ottoman Empire), South Asia (the Mughal Empire), and East Asia (the Qing Empire). The five imperial regions shared the economic activation of the long sixteenth century and benefited from it. The imperial regions were products of territorial imagination, rather than of state institutions; this is why reproduction of imperial ethics and culture played a decisive role. When the non-European early modern empires became unable to play this role, their epoch ended and Europe eventually started to absorb them one by one.

Let me briefly overview the three trends that converged into Japanese imperiology. The global history school emerged by overcoming economic determinism, characteristic of the early world system theory. Various new concepts facilitated this theoretical development: structural power (Susan Strange),⁶ invisible empires, and gentlemanly capitalism (Cain and Hopkins).⁷ The global history school brings states back into the study of the world system and construes colonial and peripheral elites as independent actors, with whom the imperial metropolis had no alternative but to bargain. Shigeru Akita explains the transformation of the British Empire from its zenith at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the interwar period. Akita argues against the juxtaposition of visible (official) and invisible territories of the empire. First, the invisible territories of the British Empire were maintained by the operative dispatch of the Indian Army, which was sustained by India’s own budget and beyond parliamentary control, in contrast to the homeland army. Second, British-Indian trade was the key factor in the multilateral settlement system, on which the British Empire’s economic power relied. India earned huge export surpluses from the United States and Europe, while the City (London) absorbed these surpluses by

⁶ Susan Strange, *States and Markets: An Introduction to Political Economy* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988).

⁷ Peter J. Cain and Antony G. Hopkins, *Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: The New Debate on Empire* (London; New York: Longman, 1999).

exporting manufactured goods to India. In the interwar period, having lost the possibility of mobilizing the Indian Army at will, the British Empire became more dependent on the multilateral settlement system as economic structural power; the income from capital export (namely, interest and dividends) increased. Industrialization in East Asia served this changing empire complementarily; Japan's capital import counted for more than 20 percent of the foreign loans raised in London during 1900-1913.⁸

In comparison with the other two trends (global history and composite monarchies), the specialists of Central Eurasian empires is most indigenous to Japan and is an ambitious group. Exploiting the linguistic expertise required of Japanese Orientalists (reading Chinese, Manchurian, Mongolian, and Tibetan fluently), it challenges the Eurocentric periodization of world history; Japanese studies on Central Eurasian empires identify the Pax Mongolica in the thirteenth century, not the emergence of proto-capitalism in Western Europe in the sixteenth century, as the decisive turning point in world history.⁹

Masaaki Sugiyama lists features of nomadic empires in Central Eurasia: (1) states modeled after cavalry battle formation; (2) military, administrative, and social organizations based on the decimal system; (3) unified monarchy of tribes; (4) imperial guard created around the monarch, composed of the next generation of elites, and cooperating with a relatively small group of multinational brains; (5) indirect rule and preservation of existing rulers who had surrendered to the empire; (6) a hierarchy of these newcomer elites according to the chronological order of their participation in the empire; (7) cosmopolitanism of successor elite generations, often cultivated by their collective fostering in the imperial court; (8) weak racism, coupled with cadre recruitment based

⁸ Akita Shigeru, *Igirisu teikoku to Ajia kokusai chitsujo: Hegemoni kokka kara teikoku-tekina koushou kenryoku he* [The British Empire and the International Order in Asia: From a Hegemonic State to Imperial Structural Power] (Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 2003).

⁹ Recently, Hidehiro Okada, professor emeritus at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, one of the founders of the study of Central Eurasian empires in Japan, repeated this idea. "Interview, Okada Hidehiro: Shin-cho toha nanika" [What Was the Qing Dynasty?], *Kan: History, Environment, Civilization*, 16 (2009), pp. 7-37. See also Sugiyama Masaaki, *Mongoru teikoku to nagai sonogo* [The Mongolian Empire and Its Protracted Aftermath] (Tokyo: Kodan Publishers, 2008).

on individuals' merits, ability, family lineage, and cliental factors; and (9) legal pluralism and confessional tolerance. Overall, nomadic empires were personal (non-territorial) states, as is shown by the fact that the words "il" (Turkic) and "ulus" (Mongolian), both meaning states, derive from "group of people."¹⁰ The specialists largely agree that these features characterized nomadic empires, beginning with the Hun state and ending with the successor states of the Timurid Empire (Safavid, Mughal, and Ottoman). In Chapter 4, Kiyohiko Sugiyama tries to extend this lineage to include the Qing Empire.

The composite monarchy school in Japan shares the historiographic process in Europe, initiated by J. G. A. Pocock and successfully combined with empire studies by David Armitage.¹¹ Exactly as Central Eurasia specialists regard the nomadic empire as a device to integrate vast territories with various religions and traditions, specialists of early modern Europe highlight the capability of composite monarchies to incorporate various law territories into an empire.¹² In fifteenth- to seventeenth-century Europe, the universal authority of the Pope and Holy Roman emperor declined, while medieval princedoms and city, order, and Episcopal states competed to create larger states by incorporating others. There were about one and a half thousand independent polities in Europe in 1500, but this number diminished to twenty-five in 1900.¹³ In this process, however, contemporaries did not appreciate the method of integrating these small polities into a single law territory, which would later be named nation-state building, as either feasible or even desirable. For extension of the mainland legal

¹⁰ Sugiyama Masaaki, "Teikoku-shi no myakuraku: Rekishi no nakano moderu-ka ni mukete" [The Coherence of Imperial History: Quest for a Model in History], *Teikoku no kenkyu*, pp. 68-69.

¹¹ J. G. A. Pocock, "British History: A Plea for a New Subject," *The Journal of Modern History* 47: 4 (1975), pp. 601-621; David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

¹² Iwai Jun, "Buriten kinsei no kokka to teikoku" [State and Empire in Early Modern Britain], *Rekishigaku Kenkyukai*, ed., *Teikoku heno aratana shiza* [New Perspectives on Empire] (Tokyo: Aoki Publishers, 2005), pp. 29-66; Yamamoto Tadashi, "Fukugo kunshusei teikoku: Kinsei Seio teikoku toshiteno Igrisu Taiseiyo teikoku" [A Composite Monarchy Empire: The British Atlantic Empire as an Early Modern West European Empire], Yamamoto, *Teikoku no kenkyu*, pp. 227-256.

¹³ J. H. Elliot, "A Europe of Composite Monarchies," *Past and Present* 137 (1992), p. 49.

system, new member territories should abandon their traditional law and rights in order to be assimilated into the suzerain, which would cause tremendous resistance of the former. Moreover, this assimilation would have caused the suzerain to reshuffle officials and judges in the new peripheries, which would be costly under the then-patrimonial system of cadre recruitment. This is why the competing states incorporated new territories through composite monarchy, whereby a “foreign” monarch obtained new territories through marriage, inheritance, and gift, and promised the new subject-elites that he would respect their traditional faith, law, and customs.

Europe enjoyed the conditions for composite monarchy. Even if the papal and Holy Roman imperial authorities were waning, all the crown families in Europe were relatives which implied that European dynasties as a whole composed a mega-imperial system. Even the religious wars in the seventeenth century did not destroy this blood-driven mega-imperial system.

The second breakthrough in empire studies in Japan would seem to be the realization of the 21st Century Center of Excellence Program, “Making a Discipline of Slavic Eurasian Studies,” which continued from 2003 to 2008. Under the aegis of this program, the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, organized a number of international seminars and conferences. Many papers presented at these events have been published in the “Slavic Eurasian Studies” series.¹⁴ Although most of these papers are of an empirical nature and focus on the Russian, partly Ottoman, and Iranian empires, the SRC endeavored to theorize the findings in close collaboration with the Kansai school. An epoch-making event was the joint symposium entitled “The Emergence of International Order and Regional Features in Modern Northeast Asia,” co-organized by the Slavic Research Center and the Kansai school on March 9-10, 2007 at Hokkaido University. Historians specializing in

¹⁴ Kimitaka Matsuzato, ed., *Imperiology: From Empirical Knowledge to Discussing the Russian Empire* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007) (http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no13_ses/contents.html); Uyama Tomohiko, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007) (http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no14_ses/contents.html); Mochizuki Tetsuo, ed., *Beyond the Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2008) (http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no17_ses/contents.html).

Northeast Asia, who had been divided by language barriers and the intra-university structures of Japan,¹⁵ rallied in the same auditory and elaborated a common agenda and methodology.¹⁶ Two of the three volumes of articles, published in 2008 to summarize the achievements of the 21st Century COE Program, dedicated much of its pages to the methodological elaboration of empire studies.¹⁷ Particularly the third volume, *Eurasia — The Continent of Empires*, edited by me, largely shares approaches with the Kansai school's collection, *A Study of Empire*.¹⁸ For example, I argued that in Russia, where the conditions for composite monarchy were lacking, the system of governor-generalship substituted it. Generally, empires, composite monarchies, early modern federalism, and the system of governor-generals are devices for the integration of multiple law territories into a large state and have in fact been adopted mutually interchangeably in history.¹⁹

¹⁵ At faculties of literature, which bear the major responsibility for higher historical education at Japanese universities, specialists in the Russian Far East belong to departments of Occidental History, specialists in Manchuria, Mongolia, Korea, and mainland China — Oriental History, and specialists in Japan — Domestic History.

¹⁶ The results of this symposium were published in Sakon Yukimura, ed., *Kindai Tohoku Ajia no tanjo: Kokyo-shi heno kokoromi* [The Birth of Modern Northeast Asia: An Attempt at Transborder History] (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2008).

¹⁷ Uyama Tomohiko, ed., *Chiiki ninshiki-ron: Taminzoku kuukan no kouzou to hyosho* [Regional Cognition: The Structure and Representation of a Multinational Space] (Tokyo: Kodan Publishers, 2008); Matsuzato Kimitaka, ed., *Yurasia - teikoku no tairiku* [Eurasia — The Continent of Empires] (Tokyo: Kodan Publishers, 2008).

¹⁸ Another volume, *Regional Cognition*, revisited the concept of Orientalism in the context of Russian imperial history. While Edward Said invented this concept on the basis of Near East history, and therefore tended to juxtapose Europe and the Orient, the Russian Empire might serve as a subject facilitating a more careful application of this concept, because in this empire, multiple Europas and Orients composed a complex layer (the Poles despised the Great Russians as half-Asians, the Georgians despised the North Caucasians, regarding themselves as Europeans, etc.).

¹⁹ Matsuzato Kimitaka, "Kyokai chiiki kara sekai teikoku he: Buriten, Rosia, Shin" [From Border Regions to Global Empires: Britain, Russia, and Qing], *Yurasia*, ch. 1. An example of this interchangeability was the prince of Nassau of the Holy Roman Empire, who hereditarily monopolized the office of governor-generals of the influential provinces in Northern Netherlands since the era of Carl V; in other words, this was a unified monarchy under the appearance of a republic. These governor-generals guided the Dutch War of Independence in the sixteenth century and the wars against Louis XIV in the seventeenth century. It was no earlier than 1815 that the Netherlands, as a result of the Congress

The functional definition of empire, proposed in the collection *A Study of Empire*, faced criticism for its allegedly overstretched characteristics. In particular, relations between modern and premodern empires have become a focal point of discussion. Yoichi Kibata, specialist of the British Empire, maintains that though empires existed since ancient times, empires since the second half of the nineteenth century until World War II, namely the empires in the epoch of imperialism, differed categorically from their predecessors. First, these empires divided the world completely. Second, in most cases, the empires of this period had nation-states at their cores. Third, social and cultural factors, the worst example of which was “scientific” racism, began to play important roles in these empires’ ruling mechanism. Fourth, global communication and transportation grew incomparably with the previous periods.²⁰ Kibata is surprised to see how Masaaki Sugiyama, advocate of the functional definition of empire, recognizes but nevertheless underestimates the differences between modern and premodern empires: first, monarchies composed the core of premodern empires, while the core of modern empires was the nation-state; second, premodern empires had been largely land empires, while most modern empires appeared as oversea empires; and lastly, modern empires were characterized by nationalism and racism, while premodern empires paid little attention to races and ethnicities.²¹

My collection, *Eurasia – The Continent of Empires*, faced a similar criticism. Although distancing himself from Kibata’s excessively imperialism-biased understanding of empires, a critic argued that the history of modern empires started in the sixteenth century with the rise of the Spanish Empire and ended with the independence of Asian and African countries and eventually with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the twentieth century. These chronological limits enable researchers to contextualize the concept of empire in contrast to modern sovereign nation-states and nationalism. The excessive

of Vienna, became an official monarchy under the House of Orange-Nassau. Thus, republicanism, federalism, the office of governor-generals, and monarchism were combined and shuffled flexibly to integrate and run the state.

²⁰ Kibata Yoichi, “Gendai sekai to teikoku-ron” [The Contemporary World and Imperiology], *Teikoku heno*, pp. 11-13.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

penchant for applicability makes the analytical concept less operative.²² Obviously, this periodization is based on the idea of colonial empires functioning in the Eurocentric world system; therefore, this critic does not pay attention to the continuous existence of the Chinese People's Republic that succeeded the territories of the Qing Empire. The booming imperiology in the last decade, however, has questioned this socioeconomic understanding of empires and has begun to pay more attention to state institutions and ideas.

Specialists in composite monarchies in early modern Europe, such as David Armitage and J. G. A. Pocock, emphasize the medieval origins of the institutions and ideas of composite monarchies, and thus provide an antipode to the position of dividing European history by the sixteenth century. As already mentioned, the organizational basis of Central Eurasian empires was personal (non-territorial) nomadic states modeled after cavalry battle formation, and therefore specialists in these empires tend to trace the origins of these statehoods back to the ancient past. Kiyohiko Sugiyama, the author of Chapter 4, convincingly argues that historians should analyze Central Eurasian and Chinese history from the Great Yuan to the Qing Empire as an uninterrupted process.²³

In Western Eurasia, the archetype of the future Russian Empire took shape during the thirteenth and mid-fifteenth centuries. In the thirteenth century, the Mongolians destroyed the waning Kievan state and Danil, Alexander Nevsky's youngest son, established the Moscow principedom. In the fifteenth century, on the one hand, the Kievan-Muscovite Churches resisted the late Byzantium's ecumenist

²² Nishiyama Katsunori's review of "Eurasia – The Continent of Empires," published in *Suravu Kenkyu* [Slavic Studies] 56 (2009), p. 221. Nishiyama is a specialist of the Volga-Ural region and Central Asia. See his "Prinatie islama kreshchenymi tatarami i pravoslavnaia tserkov': etnokul'turnoe protivostoianie na Srednem Povolzh'e v seredine XIX v.," K. Matsuzato, ed., *Novaia volna v izuchenii etnopoliticheskoi istorii Volgo-Ural'skogo regiona* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2004) (http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publicntn/volga_ural/contents.html).

²³ Sugiyama Kiyohiko, "Minsho no Manchuria shinshutsu to joshin-jin kibi-eisho-sei: Yurashia karamita posuto-mongoru jidai no hoppo sekai" [Early Ming's Advance to Manchuria and the Jurchen Guards: The Northeast Asia of the Post-Mongol Era, Viewed from the Eurasian World], Kikuchi Toshihiko and Nakamura Kazuyuki, eds., *Chusei no Hokuto Ajia to Ainu: Nurugan einei-ji hibun to Ainu no hoppo sekai* [Medieval Northeast Asia and the Ainu: Epigraph of the Yong-ning Temple at Nurgan and the Northern World of the Ainu] (Tokyo: Koshi Shoin, 2008), pp. 105-134.

tendency²⁴ and eventually claimed autocephaly from the Constantinople Ecumenical Church, and, on the other hand, the Kipchak Khanate split. In other words, the cradle of the Muscovite state was a territory where the peripheries of three traditions, namely the former Kievan Rus, the Kipchak Khanate, and the canonical territory of the Constantinople Ecumenical Church, overlapped. This extraordinary location gave the Muscovite state abundant opportunities to expand by absorbing the former territories of these historical entities and, moreover, to justify the expansion as “recovery of lost lands” or “succession of authority,” but not conquest. This is a situation similar to that enjoyed by the nascent Qing Empire; it was born in a spot where the peripheries of the Han-Chinese, Tibetan Buddhist, and Great Yuan traditions overlapped. This is why the Qing Dynasty vigorously expanded to incorporate these historical territories.

As we have seen in regard to Europe and Eastern and Western Eurasia, the origins of *modern* empires had little to do with socioeconomic modernity, such as proto-industrialization, which would later make colonial acquisition possible, and print capitalism, which would later provide the basis of national consciousness. Three decades ago, the world system theory tried to distinguish empires after the sixteenth century from their predecessors, but recent imperiology provides a vantage point for bridging modern and premodern histories.

Traditionally, historians have identified empire as a hierarchy of nationalities. Since nations are constructions of the modern age, this definition is only applicable to modern empires. Even in regard to modern empires, the recent scholarly interest in state institutions and ideas began to reorient the research agenda from nationalities to law territories, which composed empires. Modern Japan conquered Taiwan and the Korean peninsula. Had the Taiwanese and Korean populations been governed by the same law effective in Japan proper, the Japanese

²⁴ The Constantinople Church tried to be saved from Ottoman assaults by appealing the Roman Catholic Church. This strategy could not gain the understanding of Russian and other Slavic Orthodox believers, who had been ruled by Muslims for a long time but preserved their faith. See John Meyendorff, *Byzantium and the Rise of Russia: A Study of Byzantino-Russian Relations in the Fourteenth Century* (Crestwood, New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1989); Idem, *Rome, Constantinople, Moscow: Historical and Theological Studies* (Crestwood, New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003).

Empire would have been a colonial and multinational state, but not an empire. The Japanese Empire was an empire because the laws enforced in Taiwan and Korea differed from those in Japan proper and also from each other. As was exactly the case with the Russian Empire, the governor-generals in Taiwan and Korea played the important role of integrating differing law territories into an empire. As already described in regard to composite monarchies, empires did not necessarily intend to assimilate the territorial acquisitions judicially, but instead often tried to exploit their internal judicial diversities for territorial integration. Moreover, empires sometimes took advantage of their legal diversity for further expansion. For example, the nineteenth-century Russian government intentionally preserved the Byzantine judicial tradition in Bessarabia in order to use this region as a springboard for its further expansion into the former Byzantine territories (the Black Sea Rim, the Balkans, and even the Near East).²⁵

The law territories composing empire should not be understood as homogeneous legal entities. Britain was not only the combination of three (English, Scottish, and Irish) law territories, but moreover, each of them was “contaminated”; for example, Scotland had a number of communities with Gaelic or Norwegian judicial remnants. What makes history more complex is that empires, including modern ones, often combine territorial and personal legal principles. In the Japanese Empire, ordinary Taiwanese and Koreans were bound to their law territories, while ethnic Japanese and those Taiwanese and Koreans who were adopted into Japanese families (to be more correct, houses or *ie*) enjoyed the rights they had in Japan proper even when they stayed in Taiwan and Korea. This personal principle of law secured mobility of the ruling nationality and thus reinforced the integrity of the empire.²⁶ Considering these multiplicities, the legal principle of modern empires should be properly qualified as “state-dominated legal pluralism.”²⁷

²⁵ Shida Kyoko, *Rosia teikoku no bocho to togo: posuto-Bizants kukan toshiteno Bessarabia* [The Expansion and Integration of the Russian Empire: Bessarabia as a Post-Byzantium Space] (Sapporo: Hokkaido University Press, 2009).

²⁶ Asano Toyomi, *Teikoku Nihon no shokuminchi hosei* [The Colonial Legal System of the Japanese Empire] (Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 2008).

²⁷ Lauren Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History 1400-1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ch. 1.

This definition enables us to overcome a traditional juxtaposition of the (second) British and French/Russian/Japanese types of empire. Historians used to believe that the former type was based on indirect rule of colonies and eternalized discrimination between the metropolitan and colonial populations, while the latter, at least as an eventual purpose, targeted the legal assimilation of all subjects of the empire by introducing a universal legal space. For example, in the Russian Empire, statesmen and jurists shared the opinion that the institution of governor-generals should steadily shrink its territorial jurisdictions and pass them on to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in charge of the internal (mainland) legal system. The position of regarding legal pluralism as an attribute of empires, not as a compromise situation forced by their administrative incompetence, opens a new perspective in analyzing colonial societies; “traditions” and “customary laws” in colonies were often invented through the interactions between metropolitan (colonial) and local legal institutions. This is what Akihito Kudo argues in Chapter 1.²⁸

Kazuhiko Yago analyzes three Russian and Soviet banks’ balance sheets in Chapter 3. Yago is a specialist in international financial history and learnt Russian and participated in the study of Russian history relatively late. Because of his unbound position in having historiography and economics expertise, Yago’s view sharply contrasts with previous influential research papers by Igor Lukoianov. According to Lukoianov, the Russo-Chinese Bank (RCB) steadily became an instrument of Sergei Witte to realize his Far East policy, and therefore many of its operations were irrational from the managerial point of view. Although Lukoianov’s research is based on serious archival work, he does not conduct economic analyses, indispensable for judging the success or failure of any corporation. Moreover, his judgment is often contradictory; he notes the RCB’s adventurism revealed in rapid opening of branches in China and land speculations in Shandong, but on the other hand, he criticizes the RCB’s inactiveness in obtaining concessions in Manchuria.²⁹

²⁸ In fact, this chapter shares ideas and methods with Lauren Benton’s study of the French colony in West Africa. See Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures*, pp. 153-161. Among North American specialists of the Russian Empire, Virginia Martin exploited this method in her *Law and Custom in the Steppe: The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001).

²⁹ I. V. Lukoianov, “*Ne ostat’ ot derzhav...*” *Rossiiia na Dal’nem Vostoke v kontse XIX – nachale*

Lukoianov's negative view of the RCB's activities contradicts his own finding that its net profit amounted to 1,145,000 rubles even in 1904, after the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War.³⁰ According to Lukoianov, it would appear that Russia completely retreated from the Chinese financial market after its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War; but the successor to the RCB, the Russo-Asiatic Bank, left six branches in China, including Hankow and Hong Kong. Yago emphasizes the continuity of the transnational functions of the three Russian and Soviet banks, with all of them connected to the West, Russia, and China, procuring money from the West (mainly by acceptances and deposits), and investing in China and the Far East (by loans).

Lukoianov's analysis reveals Russo-centrism and lacks a transnational perspective; he judges the RCB's operations solely by how much they contributed to Russia's policy purposes. It is undeniable that Russia's Far East policy was vulnerable by nature for the lack of a self-sufficient hinterland, but the aforementioned collection, *The Birth of Modern Northeast Asia* (2008), proposes a different, transnational view. Russia's incorporation into East Asia after the mid-nineteenth century intensified the economic integrity of this region, exactly because of Russia's regional incompetence. The emergence of the newcomer with absolute import surplus and desperate deficit in labor power could not but stimulate trade and migration around the Sea of Japan and benefit local economies in Kyushu, Hokkaido, and Shandong, to name a few. This seems to be a fundamental background to the profits that the RCB earned, which Lukoianov fails to explain.³¹

XX *vv.* (St Petersburg: Nestr-Istoriia, 2008), pp. 174-185. Lukoianov's original essay on the RCB was published under the title "Russko-Kitaiskii bank (1895-1904 gg.);" in *Nestor* 2 (2000), pp. 177-199.

³⁰ Lukoianov, "Ne ostat'", p. 168.

³¹ This issue has been well studied in Japanese historiography: Ishikawa Ryota, "Kindai Higashi Ajia no Rosia tsuka ryutsu to Chosen" [Korea and the Circulation of Russian Currencies in Modern East Asia], *Rosia-shi kenkyu* [History of Russia] 78 (2006), pp. 69-78; Asada Masafumi, "Kasho Kihodai: Rosia teikoku niokeru 'kokyo-sha' no ichirei" [Migrant Chinese Merchant Ji Fengtai: The Case of a Transnationalist in the Russian Empire], *Mat-suzato, Yurasia*, pp. 295-319; Hara Teruyuki, "Kindai Tohoku Ajia koeki nettowaku no seiritsu: Kan-Nihon kai wo chushin ni" [The Emergence of the Trade Network in Modern Northeast Asia: Focusing on the Rim of the Sea of Japan], Sakon, *Kindai Tohoku Ajia*, pp. 25-59; Fumoto Shinichi, "Kokusai-teki kankyo kara mita Nichi-Ro kan no koro keisei" [The

Coincidentally, both of the two specialists of the Japanese Empire in this volume, Toyomi Asano and Toshihiro Higuchi, focus on problems caused by the massive migration of people, reoriented distribution of goods, and possible dislocation of industrial assets after the collapse of the Japanese Empire. We cannot but notice the possibilities opened up by these papers for comparative study of the collapse of empires. First of all, there have been two patterns of collapse: that followed by massive relocation of the former dominant nationality (the Japanese Empire and the Third Reich) and that without this forced expulsion (the Hungarians after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, the Russians after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and temporarily, the Serbs after the collapse of Yugoslavia). Whilst the collapse of empires without subsequent massive migration has enjoyed a certain research tradition and been theorized as an issue of “external homeland,”³² the collapse of empires followed by massive migration seems to have been less studied. Even the studies on Germans’ expulsion after World War II, which obviously attracts more academic interest than the expulsion of Japanese after the war, began to be published in this century.³³ This is perhaps a result of the self-accusatory historiographies of the former Axis nations.

Chapter 2 by Toshihiro Higuchi represents a constructivist approach to health and environment. His approach reminds us of the statement by William Johnston who studied the prevention of tuberculosis in modern Japan. “Epidemics are far more than objectively measurable biological events or episodes of importance to medical scientists: they are also political events in which the strings of power determine how a society responds to a widespread threat to health; and they are cultural events

Making of Sea Lanes between Japan and Russia from the Viewpoint of the International Environment], Sakon, *Kindai Tohoku Ajia*, pp. 61-82; Amano Naoki, “Saharin sekitan to Tohoku Ajia kaiiki-shi” [Sakhalin Coal and the Sea History of Northeast Asia], Sakon, *Kindai Tohoku Ajia*, pp. 83-109.

³² Roger Brubaker, “National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe,” *Daedalus* 124: 2 (1995), pp. 107-132.

³³ Steffen Prauser and Arfon Rees, eds., *The Expulsion of “German” Communities from Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War* (Florence: European University Institute, 2004); Matthew Frank, *Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population Transfer in Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); T. David Curp, *A Clean Sweep? The Politics of Ethnic Cleansing in Western Poland, 1945-1960* (New York and Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006).

that reflect a society's most deeply held values and beliefs."³⁴ Higuchi confirms an established view that historically, people often imagined the nation-state as an analog of the healthy human body.³⁵ The Japanese population perceived both former subjects of the Japanese Empire and American occupiers as analogous to pathogens or vermin. Environmental history is often associated with the Braudelian tradition of long-term history.³⁶ Higuchi's chapter demonstrates that an environmental issue can be the product of a key turning point in history and, in turn, affect the intensive course of events.

Asano's paper is based on the last chapter of his voluminous book (782 pages without counting indexes) dedicated to the colonial legal system of the Japanese Empire. The repatriation of a colossal number of overseas Japanese, 3,410,000 civilians and 3,110,000 military personnel,³⁷ was a serious challenge even from the technical point of view. Asano argues that the victimization of the repatriates, similar to the case of other war victims, such as of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, played an important role in Japan's postwar nation "re-building". In his book, Asano quotes the first postwar Prime Minister, Prince Higashikurunomiya Naruhiko: "Our nation, pressed back to the small Japan at the time of the Meiji Restoration, should draw lessons for the future from past errors, turn over a new leaf, immediately start to build a new Japan as a democratic, peaceful state with justice and excellent culture, and promptly recover from the damage caused by the war. We have had enough of war.

³⁴ William Johnston, *The Modern Epidemic: A History of Tuberculosis in Japan* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. v.

³⁵ Among Japanese Slavists, Fukuda Hiroshi made a point of this analogy in his *Shintai no kokumin-ka: Takyoku-ka suru Cheko shakai to taiso undo* [Nationalization of the Body: Multi-polarizing Czech Society and the Gymnastics Movement] (Sapporo: Hokkaido University Press, 2006).

³⁶ See, as an example of relatively "short" chronological scope of environmental history, Nikolai M. Dronin and Edward G. Bellinger, *Climate Dependence and Food Problems in Russia 1900-1990: The Interaction of Climate and Agricultural Policy and Their Effect on Food Problems* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2005), and my review of this book in *Russian Review*, 65: 4 (October 2006), pp. 717-719.

³⁷ According to the statistics at the end of 1945, there still remained 3,340,000 Japanese overseas: 700,000 in Korea, 400,000 in Taiwan, 400,000 in Sakhalin, 4000 in the Kurile Islands, 1,230,000 in Manchuria and Kuandong, 46,6000 in mainland China, and 143,000 on the islands in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific (Asano, *Teikoku Nihon*, p. 568).

Henceforth, we will become harbingers, the highest apostles of humanity, endeavoring to realize the elimination of arms and wars, world peace, and the happiness of mankind.³⁸ Postwar leaders, such as Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, described the repatriates as war victims who made the above quick penitence possible. In the colonial period, however, Japanese colonists often behaved as semi-imperialists and resisted the relatively liberal, pro-Asian colonial policy in Korea on the eve of its unification with Japan (1910) and in the early Manchurian State. Asano describes the Japanese government's international claim to repatriates' properties as contradictory, too.

Summarizing the couple of years of the authors' cooperation in publishing this collection, I would like to emphasize that empire specialists in Japan neither live in an intellectual reservation, nor "invent bicycles."³⁹ We are firmly integrated in the world's historiographic process and struggling to overcome the unexplainable barrier that isolated our predecessors from active dialogue with foreign colleagues. As this collection demonstrates, Japanese empire studies have made relatively abundant achievements in the judicial approach to empires, which is unjustifiably undeveloped in the study of the Russian Empire in English-speaking countries. Japan has a strong tradition of Central Eurasian studies, which contributed to the discovery of Eurasian empires as epoch makers in world history. This collection demonstrates that the Japanese Empire deserves much more scholarly attention in empire studies in general than it enjoys now. Yago's chapter reveals the academic potential attainable by combining imperial and transnational (regional) histories. We earnestly hope for vigorous feedback which will make this series a true global agora for historiographic dialogue.

Kimitaka Matsuzato

October 19, 2009, Sapporo

³⁸ Quoted in Asano, *Teikoku Nihon*, p. 571.

³⁹ A Russian idiom to express people who claim the newness for their "findings," which is widely known.